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## 1 Executive Summary: Fostering Readiness Through Positive Command Climates

This report underscores the critical link between a strong command climate and the lethality of the U.S. military. Leveraging insights from data-driven tools like Command Climate Assessments (CCAs), Defense Organizational Climate Surveys (DEOCS), Defense Organizational Climate Pulse (DOCP) surveys, and On-Site Installation Evaluations (OSIEs), the Department of Defense (DoD) is actively identifying and addressing factors that could either enhance or hinder mission effectiveness.

### 1.1 Key Findings Underscoring the Need for Action

High stress levels across the force undermine resilience and, consequently, overall readiness. Conversations with Service members through DoD's OSIE initiative reveal:

- Stress is exacerbated by quality of life factors like inadequate housing, childcare, and limited spousal employment opportunities.
- Perceptions of unfairness in opportunities and outcomes, such as lack of consistent access to highquality resources within joint environments, erode trust and create unnecessary friction between Service members.
- Low morale risks disengagement and has the potential to undermine the warrior ethos. On-theground reports of concerns about leadership responsiveness and a perceived lack of empathy contribute to morale issues.

Although improved from past years, unit dynamics at the Military Service Academies (MSAs) indicate unique challenges with high rates of stress, harmful behaviors, and work-life imbalance, necessitating sustainment of targeted interventions to cultivate future leaders.

The Department can leverage existing strong leadership, particularly at the immediate supervisor and senior enlisted levels, to address concerns of Service members and their support teams and improve warfighter readiness.

### 1.2 Decisive Actions to Enhance Readiness in Support of Lethality

Building upon ongoing efforts to address identified command climate issues and to enhance readiness, DoD is actively:

- Empowering leaders at all levels with the data, resources, and expertise to understand and address their unique command climate challenges.
- Investing in the Integrated Primary Prevention Workforce (IPPW) to provide specialized knowledge and support for prevention activities tailored to local needs.
- Prioritizing research and evaluation to ensure a nuanced understanding of the factors driving command climate and to identify evidence-based solutions.
- Equipping military leaders to proactively forge strong command climates through the creation of Comprehensive Integrated Primary Prevention (CIPP) Plans.

 Focusing on continued transformation at the MSAs through initiatives like the Climate Transformation Task Force (CTTF) to cultivate leaders of character who are empowered to build ready and lethal teams.

### 1.3 Conclusion

DoD data show that cultivating a command climate where Service members feel supported, valued, and empowered is a strategic imperative directly linked to the readiness and effectiveness of the U.S. military. By prioritizing data-driven decision-making, investing in prevention efforts, and empowering leaders at all levels, DoD is taking decisive action to build a more resilient, cohesive, and lethal force prepared to confront the challenges of the 21st century.

### 2 Oversight of Command Climate

Congressionally mandated by the National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years (FY) 2013 and 2014<sup>1</sup> and implemented by DoD Instruction (DoDI) 6400.11 (2022), "Integrated Primary Prevention Policy for Prevention Workforce and Leaders," CCAs are a key organizational process that should be leveraged as a tool in the Department's prevention system.

Data is a key element in the system required to prevent harmful behaviors such as suicide, sexual assault, and domestic and child abuse. CCAs are a foundational tool to "understand the problem," the first step in the Department's prevention process contained in the Department's Prevention Plan of Action (PPoA) 2.0 (DoD, 2022). Using results from CCAs, leaders at all levels, supported by the IPPW, are empowered with real-time information to prevent harmful behaviors, optimize human performance, foster resiliency, promote comprehensive warfighter well-being, and fortify military community readiness.

Several policies codify the utilization of CCAs to achieve the Department's goals towards integrated primary prevention. DoDI 6400.09 (2020), "DoD Policy on Integrated Primary Prevention of Self-Directed Harm and Prohibited Abuse or Harm," established the Department's integrated primary prevention system to facilitate integrated, data-informed actions to prevent harmful behaviors. Prevention of harmful behaviors not only contributes to Service member health, safety, and resilience, but is a strategic imperative for maintaining a force that is cohesive, adaptable, and prepared to meet the demands of an increasingly complex and challenging security environment.

DoDI 6400.11 (2022) assigns oversight responsibilities for CCAs for the Department to the Executive Director for Force Resiliency in collaboration with the Prevention Collaboration Forum and with operational support from the Office of People Analytics (OPA). Unit commanders and organizational leaders are responsible for ensuring CCAs are completed for their unit or organization in accordance with the policies, procedures, and parameters established by their Component.

DoD conducts OSIEs as an on-the-ground oversight mechanism to assess factors contributing to trends observed in the CCAs and to identify concrete actions needed to enhance unit dynamics. OSIEs are

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The requirement for CCAs for DoD organizations is specified in section 572 of the NDAA for FY 2013, as amended by section 1721 of the NDAA for FY 2014.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Integrated primary prevention refers to prevention activities that simultaneously address multiple self-directed harm and prohibited abusive or harmful acts or the inclusion of prevention activities across self-directed harm and prohibited abusive or harmful acts into a cohesive, comprehensive approach that promotes unity of effort, avoids unnecessary duplication, and lessens training fatigue. Defined in DoDI 6400.09 (2020).

implemented in accordance with DoDI 6400.11 (2022) and use information from CCAs, among other metrics, to identify installations/ships with strong resilience or risk factors. The OSIE findings complement CCA metrics by systematically illustrating how the prevention system operates across locations, missions, and Military Services. A brief overview of both tools and findings from Calendar Year (CY) 2024 are presented below.

#### 2.1 Command Climate Assessment Overview

A CCA is "a systematic procedure used to gather information on an organization's climate and respond to identified issues" (DoDI 6400.11, 2022). CCAs provide crucial insights into the risk and protective factors that directly impact unit performance, empowering leaders to proactively address potential mission-detracting issues and to cultivate resilient and ready warfighters. Because the data are localized to the unit/organization level, commanders and other organizational leaders can assess the unique strengths of their unit/organization, as well as identify opportunities for improvement. Directed by the FY 2013 NDAA and pursuant to DoDI 6400.11, CCAs are conducted annually, as well as after a change of command or leadership. The DEOCS and DOCP are survey tools used at specified points during CCAs.

During the Annual CCA, military and civilian leaders administer a DEOCS for their unit or organization between August 1 and November 30. Leaders are encouraged to consider additional data from sources such as focus groups, interviews, and record reviews to take a multifaceted approach to understanding their command climate.

During a Change of Command CCA, the incoming commander/leader reviews CCA results administered under prior commanders/leaders and collects additional information within 90 days after the change occurs. Commanders and leaders cannot administer a DEOCS during the Change of Command CCA, but have the option to administer a DOCP, a shorter, customizable climate survey.<sup>3</sup> A DOCP can also be administered for other needs, such as measuring outcomes after implementing a prevention activity.

Results of CCAs are fed into CIPP Plans, which detail a military community's integrated primary prevention needs, goals, and desired outcomes. Further, CIPP Plans outline the activities commanders/leaders and prevention personnel will take to achieve those outcomes, as well as plans for evaluating effectiveness of those activities. CIPP Plans are submitted annually in January and updated in July.

Figure 1 depicts the entire lifecycle of the CCA and improvement process.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> If a Change of Command CCA occurs during the Annual CCA, a single CCA (including a DEOCS) is conducted to fulfill both requirements. However, if the required time periods do not cooccur, both a Change of Command CCA and Annual CCA are required.




Figure 1. Command Climate Assessment and Improvement Lifecycle

### 2.2 Defense Organizational Climate Survey

Although the DEOCS is primarily intended as a commander's/leader's tool, aggregated DEOCS results can provide insight into command climate across Components and the Total Force.<sup>4</sup> The DEOCS, which was most recently fielded from August 1 to November 30, 2024, is administered by unit/organization-level representatives using infrastructure provided by OPA as part of the required Annual CCA. To field a DEOCS, a unit/organization creates a registration within the infrastructure of OPA and provides a roster of all members of the unit/organization. In 2024, a total of 2,513,944 personnel were rostered across 10,629

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> DEOCS results provide valuable insights into the Total DoD but are not inherently representative of the entire Department. Aggregated DEOCS results are representative of those that were registered for a DEOCS. OPA is continuing work to help understand potential differences between those who are rostered and not rostered for the DEOCS, assessing the generalizability of DEOCS results to the true DoD population. Efforts to ensure that every unit/organization is registering for, and completing, a DEOCS increase generalizability.

units/organization registrations. Of the individuals rostered, 1,070,123 returned completed surveys, generating a 43% response rate for those registered.

The 2024 DEOCS included new methodological approaches that increased insight into the command climate of the force. For the first time, commanders/leaders received DEOCS results that were weighted to account for potential differences between those who responded to the DEOCS and those who did not, providing increased confidence that reported ratings accurately represent the true sentiments of the entire unit/organization. For the purposes of this report, Total DoD aggregations include Joint Service units, DoD civilian organizations, Active and Reserve Components, and MSA and MSA Preparatory Schools.<sup>5</sup> Total DoD estimates do not include data from Coast Guard DEOCS registrations (see Appendix A).

In general, when examining DEOCS results for strengths and threats, favorable ratings indicate conditions in which harmful behaviors are less likely, whereas unfavorable ratings indicate conditions that may pose a risk for harmful behaviors. Methods to calculate favorable and unfavorable ratings for each risk/protective factor vary by the number of items within the scale and response options (e.g., *Never*, to *Often*, *Strongly Disagree* to *Strongly Agree*).<sup>6</sup> Favorable ratings are calculated scores representing less risky, more resilient responses to a given factor. For example, the favorable rating for *Morale*, also referred to as *High Morale*, represents the combination of all responses of *Strongly Agree* and *Agree* from both questions in the *Morale* scale.<sup>7</sup> Conversely, unfavorable ratings are the calculated scores representing more risky, less resilient responses to a given factor. For example, the unfavorable rating for *Stress*, also referred to as *Moderate/High Stress*, represents the combination of all responses of *Sometimes* and *Often* to all four questions in the *Stress* scale.<sup>8</sup>

Overall, ratings across DoD for the 18 risk and protective factors demonstrate the Department's command climate is strong, with a few notable strengths as well as opportunities for improvement. The sections below highlight the factors with particularly strong and weak scores and provide a discussion of differences between subgroups, including Components, Military Services, and key demographic groups.

Although some differences in scores can be observed between groups, it is important to note the current analysis does not include statistical significance testing or margins of error. As a result, the degree and importance of those differences should be interpreted with caution. Additionally, this report presents results at various levels of aggregation, but for all factors, there is considerable variation in favorable and unfavorable scores among individual unit/organizational-levels. Thus, commanders/leaders should closely examine the scores for individual units/organizations in their chain of command to identify

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> In this report, the acronym "MSA" includes students attending the U.S. Military Academy, U.S. Naval Academy, and U.S. Air Force Academy, as well as students attending the MSA Preparatory Schools.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> See the "DEOCS 5.1 Factor Rating Interpretation Guide" in the Defense Climate Portal Resource Center on prevention.mil for a full explanation of factor rating calculations for each factor.
 <sup>7</sup> The following items are used to assess *Morale* on the DEOCS using a five-point scale from *Very Low* to *Very High*.

The following items are used to assess *Morale* on the DEOCS using a five-point scale from *Very Low* to *Very High*. Participants are asked to think about the past three months when responding, or to think about their time with their current unit/organization if they joined less than three months ago: (1) "Overall, how would you rate the current level of morale among the people you work with in your unit?"; (2) "Overall, how would you rate your own current level of morale?"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The following items are used to assess *Stress* on the DEOCS using a four-point response scale from *Never* to *Often*. Participants are asked to think about the past three months when responding, or to think about their time with their current unit/organization if they joined less than three months ago: (1) "In the past three months, how often have you felt nervous or stressed?" and (2) "In the past three months, how often have you found that you could not cope with all of the things you had to do?"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> At the time of this report, statistical significance testing and margins of error are still in development. For ease of interpretation, apparent differences are identified in the text typically when greater than five percent.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> See Appendix A1 for unit/organization factor score ranges for all factors.

any distinct patterns that warrant special attention. Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 highlight the protective factors with the highest and lowest favorable scores and the risk factors with the highest and lowest unfavorable scores. The full aggregated DEOCS results are presented in Appendix A.

#### 2.2.1 Protective Factors

DEOCS protective factors measure attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors associated with positive outcomes for organizations or units (i.e., increased readiness/retention and decreased prevalence of harmful behaviors). Figure 2 displays the favorable factor ratings for the Total DoD. Higher percentages are preferred and indicate lower risk. For the Total DoD, protective factors earned favorable ratings at or above 68% with exception of two factors: *Morale* and *Fairness*. Notably, *Leadership Support* (*Immediate Supervisor*) and *Safe Storage for Lethal Means* have particularly high favorable ratings among protective factors for the Total DoD (Figure 2).




Figure 2: 2024 DEOCS Total DoD Favorable Protective Factor Ratings

#### Leadership Support (Immediate Supervisor)

Leadership Support (Immediate Supervisor) is defined in the DEOCS as the perception that immediate supervisors build trust, encourage goal attainment and professional development, promote effective communication, and support teamwork (Brooks & Greenberg, 2018). Across the force, personnel largely report their immediate supervisors are supportive. Strong leaders are the backbone of the U.S. military; and, indeed, research demonstrates personnel with supportive leaders are more ready (Brooks & Greenberg, 2018; Jones et al., 2012), are more likely to stay (Brooks & Greenberg, 2018; Bucklin et al., 2014; Dupre & Day, 2007; Griffeth et al., 2000; Vasterling et al., 2015; Wai et al., 2014), and experience better mental health (Dupre & Day, 2007) and fewer harmful behaviors, including suicide (Griffith, 2019), sexual harassment (Offerman & Malumut, 2002), and sexual assault (Sadler et al., 2016).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> More information regarding the DEOCS protective factors is available in the "DEOCS 5.1 Factor Rating Interpretation Guide" in the Defense Climate Portal Resource Center on prevention.mil.

Table 1 displays the favorable ratings for the protective factor *Leadership Support* (*Immediate Supervisor*) by DEOCS aggregation levels (i.e., Components, Military Service). The levels of aggregation presented in this report are based on the organizational affiliation information provided for the unit/organization when the command registered to field their DEOCS.<sup>12</sup> Favorable ratings of *Leadership Support* (*Immediate Supervisor*) were the highest among all protective factors (84% for Total DoD). These scores were consistently high across all Components, ranging from 83% in the Active Component to 88% at the MSAs.

These ratings were also consistently high across both the Active and Reserve Components, with the Active Component ranging from 82% in Army and Navy to 87% in Space Force, and the Reserve Component ranging from 84% for Army Reserve to 89% for Marine Corps Reserve. Similarly, displayed in Table 2, the leadership support favorable ratings were 80% or above across demographic groups. However, differences appear larger between officers (89%) and enlisted members (83%) and between males (86%) and females (80%) than between other demographic groups. While the DoD overall has an 84% favorable rating for Leadership Support (Immediate Supervisor), the favorable scores within individual units/organizations ranged from 37% to 100% (Appendix A).

Table 1. Favorable Ratings for Leadership Support (Immediate Supervisor) by DEOCS
Aggregation Level

Component Registrations	Total DoD	Joint Service	DoD Civilian Organization	Active	Reserve	National Guard	MSAs
Registrations	84%	84%	84%	83%	85%	86%	88%
Active Component	Total Active	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Space Force	-
Registrations	83%	82%	82%	83%	85%	87%	
Reserve Component	Total Reserve	USAR	USNR	USMCR	USAFR		
Registrations	85%	84%	85%	89%	87%		

Table 2. Favorable Ratings for *Leadership Support (Immediate Supervisor)* by Demographic Group (Total DoD)

Race/Et	thnicity	Se	×	_	/Civilian atus	Enlisted/Officer Status	
Non- Hispanic White	Racial/Ethnic Minority	Male	Female	Military	Civilian	Enlisted	Officer
86%	83%	86%	80%	84%	84%	83%	89%

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Individual members of a unit/organization may have different affiliations from the unit/organization overall. For example, a unit registered as Active Component Navy may include Active and Reserve Component Navy members, DoD civilians, and/or members of other Military Services. Although individual members may have different affiliations from the unit/organization overall, their DEOCS responses are aggregated as part of the unit/organization with which

they were registered and about which they were reporting. For example, a DoD civilian working in an Active Component Navy unit is included in the aggregate estimates for Active Component Navy units because their DEOCS responses would be rating their Active Component Navy unit's climate and leadership directly.

#### Safe Storage for Lethal Means

Suicide is one of the leading causes of death among U.S. active duty Service members (DoD, 2023). According to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD(P&R)), firearms are the most common method of suicide deaths for Service members and spouses (DoD, 2024). Safely storing lethal means is one of the most robust protective factors against suicide (Shenassa et al., 2004; Simon, 2007; Stanley, et al., 2016; Grossman et al., 2005; Nock et al., 2014; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Science and Technology Organization, 2018; Saxena et al., 2014; Stone et al., 2017; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2012).

The DEOCS includes a protective factor called *Safe Storage for Lethal Means*, which measures whether one would keep a firearm safely stored (i.e., unloaded or in a secure storage container/device) if one had a firearm in their living space (Yip et al., 2012). Table 3 shows the favorable ratings for the protective factor *Safe Storage for Lethal Means* by DEOCS aggregation level. *Safe Storage for Lethal Means* was the protective factor with the second highest favorable scores. Of the Total DoD, 83% indicated they would safely store firearms. While these ratings were consistently high across Components, slight variations appeared to exist across Components, ranging from 81% in the National Guard to 89% in the MSAs. Similar variations may be observed across the Active and Reserve Components, with the Active Component ranging from 81% in the Marine Corps to 87% in the Space Force, and the Reserve Component ranging from 81% in the Marine Corps Reserve to 86% in the Air Force Reserve. Displayed in Table 4, while safe storage favorable ratings were consistently high across demographic groups, differences appear larger when stratifying by enlisted/officer status and by sex compared to other demographic groups. While the DoD overall has an 83% favorable rating for *Safe Storage for Lethal Means*, the range of unit/organization favorable scores for *Safe Storage for Lethal Means* was 34% to 100% (Appendix A).

Table 3. Favorable Ratings for Safe Storage for Lethal Means by DEOCS Aggregation Level

Component Registrations	Total DoD	Joint Service	DoD Civilian Organization	Active	Reserve	National Guard	MSAs
Registrations	83%	85%	84%	82%	84%	81%	89%
Active Component	Total Active	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Space Force	
Registrations	82%	82%	82%	81%	83%	87%	
Reserve Component	Total Reserve	USAR	USNR	USMCR	USAFR		
Registrations	84%	84%	85%	81%	86%		

Table 4. Favorable Ratings for Safe Storage for Lethal Means by Demographic Group (Total DoD)

Race/Ethnicity		Se	×	Military/Civilian Status		Enlisted/Officer Status	
Non-Hispanic White	Racial/Ethnic Minority	Male	Female	Military	Civilian	Enlisted	Officer
82%	84%	81%	88%	82%	84%	81%	86%

#### **Fairness**

Perceived lack of fair treatment by leadership in a unit/organization can lead to profound readiness issues. Lack of fairness is related to decreased performance, workplace satisfaction, loyalty to leadership, and cooperation, as well as increased turnover intentions (Boehm et al., 2014; Cho & Sai, 2013; Gutek et al., 1996; Sawyer et al., 2018; Snape & Redman, 2003).

Fairness is also a key factor in preventing sexual and racial/ethnic harassment (Benavides-Espinoza & Cunningham, 2010; Brown et al, 2018; Rubino et al., 2018; Tinkler & Zhao, 2019). In the DEOCS, Fairness is defined as the perception that organizational policies, practices, and procedures—both formal and informal—regarding information sharing, recognition, job opportunities, and promotions are based on merit, equality, and respect (Colquitt, 2001). Fairness was one of two protective factors with a noticeably lower favorable rating compared to other protective factors for the Total DoD.

The Total DoD favorable rating for *Fairness* was 58%, making *Fairness* one of the lowest rated protective factors. Fairness scores indicated apparent variability across Components, with favorable ratings ranging from 54% in DoD Civilian Organizations and 55% in the Active Components to 65% in the National Guard and 63% in the Reserve Components (Table 5). Variation across the Active Component for *Fairness* was seemingly minimal, ranging from 54% favorable ratings in the Army to 59% in the Space Force. In the Reserve Component, favorable *Fairness* ratings ranged from 62% in the Air Force Reserve to 68% in the Marine Corps Reserve. Favorable ratings followed several demographic patterns, shown in Table 6, suggesting differences in experience between women (52%) and men (60%) and enlisted members (56%) and officers (69%). At the individual unit/organizational level, the apparent degree of variation in the favorable scores was notable, with *Fairness* favorability ranging from 4% to 100% (Appendix A).

Table 5. Favorable Ratings for Fairness by DEOCS Aggregation Level

Component Registrations	Total DoD	Joint Service	DoD Civilian Organization	Active	Reserve	National Guard	MSAs
Registrations	58%	58%	54%	55%	63%	65%	59%
Active Component	Total Active	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Space Force	
Registrations	55%	54%	55%	57%	55%	59%	
Reserve Component	Total Reserve	USAR	USNR	USMCR	USAFR		1
Registrations	63%	63%	67%	68%	62%		

Table 6. Favorable Ratings for Fairness by Demographic Group (Total DoD)

Race/Ethnicity		S	ex	Military/Civilian Status		Enlisted/Officer Status	
Non-Hispanic White	Racial/Ethnic Minority	Male	Female	Military	Civilian	Enlisted	Officer
60%	57%	60%	52%	58%	55%	56%	69%

#### Morale

Morale is an essential element of a unit's/organization's readiness. *Morale* is defined in the DEOCS as the confidence, enthusiasm, collective pride, and willingness to persist in the activities of the group (Banyard, 2008, Manning, 1994). High morale is associated with better mental health, greater trust in teammates, greater willingness to deploy, and lower turnover intentions (Ivey et al., 2015; Jones et al., 2012). Consequently, low morale has potentially far-reaching and dangerous impacts on important readiness factors like retention and burden on mental health providers.

Table 7 presents the favorable ratings for the protective factor *Morale* by DEOCS aggregation levels. *Morale* is the protective factor with the least favorable rating across the Total DoD, with 46% of personnel indicated having high morale. Although the Total DoD demonstrates a lower favorable rating for *Morale* compared to other protective factors, favorable ratings for *Morale* ranged as broadly as 2% to 100% in individual units/organizations. Across Components, favorable ratings for *Morale* appear higher for the National Guard (55%) and Reserve Components (54%) and lower for the MSAs (42%) and Active Components (43%). In the Active Component, there is seemingly little variation in favorable *Morale* ratings with scores ranging from 42% in the Army to 46% in the Space Force. In contrast, the Reserve Component appeared to show more variability, with favorable *Morale* ratings ranging from 49% in the Air Force Reserve to 58% in the Marine Corps Reserve. Across demographic groups shown in Table 8, differences appear larger by officer/enlisted status and by sex than by other demographic groups.

Table 7. Favorable Ratings for *Morale* by DEOCS Aggregation Level

Component Registrations	Total DoD	Joint Service	DoD Civilian Organization	Active	Reserve	National Guard	MSAs
Registrations	46%	49%	46%	43%	54%	55%	42%
Active Component	Total Active	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Space Force	
Registrations	43%	42%	43%	43%	45%	46%	
Reserve Component	Total Reserve	USAR	USNR	USMCR	USAFR		
Registrations	54%	54%	57%	58%	49%		

Table 8. Favorable Ratings for *Morale* by Demographic Group (Total DoD)

Race/Ethnicity		Se	ex	Military/Civilian Status		Enlisted/Officer Status	
Non-Hispanic White	Racial/Ethnic Minority	Male	Female	Military	Civilian	Enlisted	Officer
47%	47%	49%	42%	46%	48%	44%	56%

#### 2.2.2 Risk Factors

Risk factors on the DEOCS measure attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors associated with negative outcomes for organizations or units (i.e., lower readiness/retention and higher prevalence of harmful behaviors). Figure 3 displays the unfavorable factor ratings for the Total DoD. Lower percentages are preferred and indicate lower risk. For the Total DoD, unfavorable ratings were 14% or lower for all but three risk factors: Stress, Racially Harassing Behaviors, and Passive Leadership (Commander). The risk factors with the lowest unfavorable ratings were Alcohol Impairing Memory, Binge Drinking, and Toxic Leadership (Senior Non-Commissioned Officer [NCO]/Senior Enlisted Leader [SEL]) (Figure 3).




Figure 3: 2024 DEOCS Total DoD Unfavorable Risk Factor Ratings

#### Stress

Stress is defined in the DEOCS as the perception or feeling of emotional strain or pressure—an experience associated with feeling unable to predict or influence valued and prominent aspects of life (Cohen & Williamson, 1991). Prior research within the U.S. military found stress to be a significant readiness detractor, leading to worse performance, more days of missed work, poor physical health, and lower retention (Brooks & Greenberg, 2018; DeTienne et al., 2012; Griffeth et al., 2000; O'Neill & Davis, 2011; Pflanz & Ogle, 2006). Accordingly, stress is also a predictor of suicide risk (Kim et al., 2017; Kline et al., 2011; Lebares et al., 2018; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Science and Technology Organization, 2018; Stone et al., 2017).

Table 9 presents the unfavorable ratings for the risk factor *Stress* by DEOCS aggregation levels, including by demographics for the Total DoD. Across the Total DoD, 42% indicated moderate/high levels of *Stress* in their unit/organization—a higher unfavorable factor rating than all other risk factors. Unfavorable ratings for *Stress* range from 3% to 89% in individual units/organizations (Appendix A). Unfavorable *Stress* ratings appeared to vary across Components, ranging from 33% in the National Guard and Reserve Component

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> More information regarding DEOCS risk factors is available in the "DEOCS 5.1 Factor Rating Interpretation Guide" in the Defense Climate Portal Resource Center on prevention.mil.

to 65% at the MSAs. Slight variation exists within the Active Component, with ratings ranging from 41% in the Marine Corps to 49% in the Navy, and within the Reserve Component, with ratings ranging from 31% in the Marine Corps Reserve to 37% in the Navy Reserve. Displayed in Table 10, although unfavorable stress ratings are similarly high across demographic groups, there appeared to be a notable difference between women (50%) and men (38%) that is not visible between other demographic groups.

Table 9. Unfavorable Ratings for Stress by DEOCS Aggregation Level

Component Registrations	Total DoD	Joint Service	DoD Civilian Organization	Active	Reserve	National Guard	MSAs
Registrations	42%	41%	42%	45%	33%	33%	65%
Active Component	Total Active	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Space Force	
Registrations	45%	43%	49%	41%	43%	47%	
Reserve Component	Total Reserve	USAR	USNR	USMCR	USAFR		
Registrations	33%	33%	37%	31%	34%		

Table 10. Unfavorable Ratings for Stress by Demographic Group (Total DoD)

Race/Ethnicity		Se	Sex		Military/Civilian Status		/Officer tus
Non-Hispanic White	Racial/Ethnic Minority	Male	Female	Military	Civilian	Enlisted	Officer
41%	41%	38%	50%	42%	41%	42%	39%

#### Passive Leadership (Commander)

Passive Leadership (Commander) is defined in the DEOCS as the perception that the unit/organization commander/leader avoids decisions, does not respond to problems, fails to follow-up, hesitates to act, and is absent when needed (Bass et al., 2003; Lee, 2018). A critical element of the warrior ethos is strong, decisive leadership. Indeed, research finds that passive leadership, sometimes known as laissez-faire leadership, is associated with a host of factors that threaten readiness, including reduced performance, safety, and cohesion, and increased burnout and turnover (Bass, 1990; Bass et al., 2003; Fosse et al., 2019; Kelloway et al., 2006; Lee, 2018; Smith et al., 2016). Passive leadership is also a risk factor for sexual harassment (Lee, 2018). For example, passive leadership could result in problematic behaviors (e.g., harassment) not being addressed in a timely or appropriate manner.

Table 11 displays the unfavorable ratings for the risk factor *Passive Leadership (Commander)* by DEOCS aggregation levels, including by demographics for the Total DoD aggregation. Across personnel in the Total DoD, 17% rated their unit/organization leader as passive. Unfavorable ratings for *Passive Leadership (Commander)* ranged between 0% to 60% in individual units/organizations (see Appendix A).

Unfavorable ratings appear consistent across Components, ranging from 14% to 20%. *Passive Leadership (Commander)* unfavorable ratings appear consistent across both the Active Component, ranging from 13% in Space Force to 19% in Marine Corps, and in the Reserve Component ranging from 17% in Air Force Reserve to 20% in Marine Corps Reserve. Displayed in Table 12, although passive leadership ratings

seemed to remain relatively consistent across demographic groups, differences appear larger between race/ethnicity and enlisted/officer status groups than by other demographic groups.

Table 11. Unfavorable Ratings for Passive Leadership (Commander) by DEOCS Aggregation Level

Component Registrations	Total DoD	Joint Service	DoD Civilian Organization	Active	Reserve	National Guard	MSAs
Registrations	17%	14%	16%	17%	18%	18%	20%
Active Component	Total Active	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Space Force	
Registrations	17%	18%	17%	19%	15%	13%	
Reserve Component	Total Reserve	USAR	USNR	USMCR	USAFR		
Registrations	18%	19%	18%	20%	17%		

Table 12. Unfavorable Ratings for *Passive Leadership (Commander)* by Demographic Group (Total DoD)

Race/Ethnicity		Se	ex .	Military/Civilian Status		Enlisted Sta	
Non-Hispanic White	Racial/Ethnic Minority	Male	Female	Military	Civilian	Enlisted	Officer
15%	19%	17%	16%	18%	15%	19%	14%

#### Racially Harassing Behaviors

After Stress, Passive Leadership (Commander) and Racially Harassing Behaviors have the next highest unfavorable ratings among risk factors—both 17%. In the DEOCS, Racially Harassing Behaviors measures the experience, or witnessing of, offensive behaviors based on race or ethnicity that occurred over the past three months (Daniel et al., 2019; U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 2021a; U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 2021b). Prevention of racial/ethnic harassment is essential because the harmful behavior is related to decreased readiness and retention (Antecol & Cobb-Clark, 2009; Boehm et al., 2014; Daniel et al., 2019; Raver & Nishii, 2010), in addition to increased risk of suicide (Mullen & Smyth, 2004; Ratkowska & De Leo, 2013; Saxena et al., 2014) and sexual harassment (Berdahl & Moore, 2006; Buchanan & Fitzgerald, 2008; Buchanan et al., 2009; Moradi & Subich, 2003).

Table 13 shows the unfavorable ratings for the risk factor *Racially Harassing Behaviors* by DEOCS aggregation levels, including by demographics for the Total DoD.<sup>14</sup> Seventeen percent of Total DoD personnel reported the presence of racially harassing behaviors in their unit/organization. With the exception of MSAs, unfavorable ratings appeared to be similar across Components, ranging from 15% in the Reserve Component to 18% in the Active Component. Within the Active Component, unfavorable ratings ranged from 14% in the Space Force to 21% in the Navy. There appeared to be less variation in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> The unfavorable rating for *Racially Harassing Behaviors* includes all respondents who reported experiencing at least one of the five behaviors rarely, sometimes, or often (i.e., they reported a presence of racially harassing behaviors).

the Reserve Component, with unfavorable ratings ranging from 13% in the Navy Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve to 15% in the Army Reserve and Air Force Reserve.

Displayed in Table 14, unfavorable ratings of *Racially Harassing Behaviors* are consistently high across demographic groups, with what appeared to be larger differences by race/ethnicity, sex, and enlisted/officer status than by military/civilian status. While 17% of personnel in DoD overall reported the presence of these behaviors in their unit/organization, scores within individual units/organizations ranged from 0% to 63% (Appendix A).

Table 13. Unfavorable Ratings for Racially Harassing Behaviors by DEOCS Aggregation Level

Component Registrations	Total DoD	Joint Service	DoD Civilian Organization	Active	Reserve	National Guard	MSAs
Registrations	17%	16%	17%	18%	15%	16%	46%
Active Component	Total Active	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Space Force	
Registrations	18%	18%	21%	17%	16%	14%	
Reserve Component	Total Reserve	USAR	USNR	USMCR	USAFR		1
Registrations	15%	15%	13%	13%	15%		

Table 14. Unfavorable Ratings for *Racially Harassing Behaviors* by Demographic Group (Total DoD)

Race/Ethnicity		Se	ex Military/0			Enlisted/Officer Status	
Non-Hispanic White	Racial/Ethnic Minority	Male	Female	Military	Civilian	Enlisted	Officer
13%	22%	16%	22%	18%	16%	19%	14%

#### Binge Drinking and Alcohol Impairing Memory

Binge Drinking measures how often, during the last three months, one consumed five or more drinks on one occasion (National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, 2020), while Alcohol Impairing Memory measures how often, during the last three months, one was unable to remember what happened the night before due to drinking alcohol (National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, 2019). These factors have similarly low unfavorable ratings; 5% and 1% of the Total DoD respectively, with what appeared to be consistent ratings across Components and demographics. Although frequent binge drinking and frequent memory loss due to alcohol (both forms of alcohol misuse) are relatively uncommon among the general population, the low unfavorable ratings observed on the DEOCS may not indicate low levels of alcohol misuse among Service members when compared to the general population. Although not an exact comparison, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration reports 23.5% of adults in the United States aged 18 and older<sup>15</sup> engaged in binge drinking in the past month (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2023). The estimated prevalence of blackout drinking among adults

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Estimate includes the civilian, noninstitutionalized population.

is typically around 50%. However, most studies focus on young adults and college students (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016). When combining frequent and infrequent DEOCS alcohol use ratings together (i.e., the unfavorable and neutral categories), 35.7% engaged in binge drinking at least once in the past three months and 8.3% of Total DoD indicated experiencing memory loss due to alcohol use. For more information on DEOCS alcohol factor scores, see Appendix A.

#### Toxic Leadership (Senior NCO/SEL)

Excluding *Alcohol Impairing Memory* and *Binge Drinking*, *Toxic Leadership (Senior NCO/SEL)* had the lowest unfavorable rating among risk factors. In the DEOCS, *Toxic Leadership (Senior NCO/SEL)* is defined as Senior NCOs or SELs that disregard input, ridicule others, and have self-promoting tendencies (Reed & Bullis, 2009). *Toxic Leadership* also includes behaviors that are demeaning, marginalizing, and/or coercive. Toxic leadership can have a negative impact on commitment, respect, morale, performance, and ultimately retention (Gallus et al., 2013; Pelletier, 2010; Reed et al., 2009; Riley et al., 2017; Steele, 2011). Toxic leadership is also correlated with an increase in Service women's risk of sexual assault (Sadler et al., 2016) and can contribute to Service members' suicidal ideations (Erickson et al., 2015).

As displayed in Table 15, when rating the Senior NCO/SEL in their unit/organization, 5% of Total DoD personnel rated them as toxic. Unfavorable ratings for *Toxic Leadership (Senior NCO/SEL)* ranged from 0% to 100% in individual units/organizations (see Appendix A). Additionally, unfavorable toxic leadership ratings appeared to vary minimally by Component, including by Active Component and Reserve Component. Senior NCO/SEL toxic leaderships ratings appear similarly low across demographic groups, displayed in Table 16.

Table 15. Unfavorable Ratings for *Toxic Leadership (Senior NCO/SEL)* by DEOCS Aggregation

Component Registrations	Total DoD	Joint Service	DoD Civilian Organization	Active	Reserve	National Guard	MSAs
Registrations	5%	3%	3%	5%	5%	5%	N/A
Active Component	Total Active	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Space Force	
Registrations	5%	5%	4%	5%	4%	2%	
Reserve Component	Total Reserve	USAR	USNR	USMCR	USAFR	1	
Registrations	5%	5%	4%	4%	5%		

Table 16. Unfavorable Ratings for *Toxic Leadership (Senior NCO/SEL)* by Demographic Group (Total DoD)

Race/Ethnicity		Sex Military/			Enlisted/Officer Status		
Non-Hispanic White	Racial/Ethnic Minority	Male	Female	Military	Civilian	Enlisted	Officer
4%	5%	5%	4%	5%	2%	5%	3%

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> See Figure A2 in Appendix A for the favorable, neutral, and unfavorable ratings of risk factors for the Total DoD.

Taken together, DEOCS results indicate, all in all, command climate across the DoD is positive. Strengths include supportive immediate supervisors, personnel engaging in safe storage for lethal means, and low levels of toxic Senior NCOs/SELs.

However, these findings also point to targeted areas where remediation is necessary. Namely, morale is low, personnel perceive their unit/organization to be unfair, and stress is high. While periods of high stress are inherent to the DoD mission, sustained moderate to high stress affecting the vast majority of the population will have deleterious impact over time if appropriate recovery time and resources are not implemented to allow for resilience or "bouncing back." Sections below highlight how some of these issues are represented in the DOCP—another CCA tool—and OSIEs, as well as how the Department is addressing them.

### 2.2.3 Military Service Academies

The unique demographic composition and organizational characteristics of the MSAs complicate comparing the command climate at the MSAs to any other organization; however there are noticeable differences in factor ratings for five DEOCS factors when comparing Total DoD aggregations to MSA aggregations.<sup>17</sup> As displayed in Table 17, compared to the Total DoD, MSA cadets and midshipmen appear to have lower favorability scores for Work-Life Balance (41% favorable compared to 68% favorable), and higher unfavorable scores for Racially Harassing Behaviors (46% unfavorable compared to 17% unfavorable), Sexist Behaviors (26% unfavorable compared to 8% unfavorable), Sexually Harassing Behaviors (42% unfavorable compared to 14% unfavorable), and Stress (65% unfavorable compared to 42% unfavorable). 18

Table 17. Protective Factors & Risk Factors by DEOCS Aggregation Level (Total DoD and MSAs)

	Component Registration by Factor	Total DoD	Joint Service	DoD Civilian Organization	Active	Reserve	National Guard	MSAs
	Work-Life Balance	68%	74%	76%	65%	70%	72%	41%
L	Racially Harassing Behaviors	17%	16%	17%	18%	15%	16%	46%
Factor	Sexist Behaviors	8%	7%	8%	8%	7%	8%	26%
	Sexually Harassing Behaviors	14%	11%	11%	15%	12%	15%	42%
	Stress	42%	41%	42%	45%	33%	33%	65%

As a protective factor, Work-Life Balance is an important indicator of physical and mental health. Work-Life Balance is defined in the DEOCS as one's perception that the demands of their work and personal life are compatible (Kalliath & Brough, 2008). MSA DEOCS scores demonstrate a noticeable deficiency in Work-Life Balance compared to the Total DoD, which has direct impacts on readiness and can eventually lead to attrition (Brooks & Greenberg, 2018; Dupre & Day, 2007; Sachau et al., 2012; Sims et al., 2019). Lack of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> As previously noted, statistical tests are not currently available to verify the visible differences in factor rating scores presented in this report.  $^{\rm 18}$  See Appendix A for additional MSA aggregate estimates for all DEOCS factors.

Work-Life Balance is also a risk factor for suicidal ideation (Hourani et al., 2018; Langhinrichsen-Rohlinget al., 2011). Additional consideration of command climate in the MSAs is in Section 3.

Risk factor prevention ensures the safety and well-being of the next generation of military leaders and also has impacts on the DoD's overall mission. While some of the negative effects of Racially Harassing Behaviors are noted above, experiences of Sexually Harassing Behaviors are similarly associated with lower readiness and retention (Breslin et al., 2019; Brown et al., 2018; Chan et al., 2008; Firestone et al., 2012; Lapierre et al., 2005; Millegan et al., 2015; Raver & Nishii, 2010; Wilness et al., 2007) and increased risk of death by suicide (Griffith, 2019). Sexually Harassing Behaviors measures unwelcome sexual advances and offensive comments or gestures of a sexual nature that occurred over the past three months (Breslin et al. 2019) while Sexist Behaviors measures prejudicial, stereotypical, or negative attitudes and opinions based on perceived sex that occurred over the past three months (Fitzgerald et al. 1988). Experiencing Sexist Behaviors can also lead to mental and physical health challenges that compromise performance and retention (Boehm et al., 2014; Breslin et al., 2019; Jahnke et al., 2019), as well as experiencing other harmful behaviors like sexual harassment and sexual assault (Anderson et al., 1997; Harris et al., 2018; Russell & Oswald, 2016; Samuelson et al., 2021; Tinkler & Zhao, 2019; Yu & Lee, 2019). Research indicates that interpersonal violence generally begets interpersonal violence, with victims being more likely to experience harm in the future and offenders being more likely to enact other forms of interpersonal harm (Wilkins et al. 2014).

### 2.3 Defense Organizational Climate Pulse

The Annual CCA cycle provides data that inform prevention actions and evaluation. To supplement the CCAs described above, the DOCP is a short, customizable survey that can be used to provide additional climate information to commanders/leaders. Although DoD policy does not require commanders/leaders to administer a DOCP, they may opt to do so for several reasons, including during a Change of Command CCA, to check progress between Annual CCAs, or to gather insights about an emerging issue. In 2024, 338 DoD units/organizations administered a DOCP, reaching 73,144 participants. Mirroring the DEOCS, the response rate across these units/organizations was 43% overall, with 31,220 participants.

Because the questions in a DOCP are chosen by the unit/organization, aggregations of responses are not possible. However, an examination of the topics included most often on DOCPs provides some insights into the command climate concerns of DoD commanders/leaders. For example, 97% of DOCP surveys included questions related to leadership and 85% included questions related to leadership support, reflecting the essential role that leaders at all levels have in influencing command climate. Other chosen topics point to the important role team dynamics have in bolstering unit/organization performance: 91% of DOCPs asked about morale, 89% asked about cohesion, and 84% asked about engagement and commitment. Further, 89% of DOCPs included items from factors also on the DEOCS, corresponding to the DOCP's role in following up on and evaluating progress from the DEOCS. For more details on the topics covered on the DOCP, see Section 8.2.

#### 2.4 On-Site Installation Evaluations

OSIEs serve as critical feedback loops to CCAs by providing context and depth to the quantitative findings in CCAs. Since 2021, the DoD has conducted OSIEs to understand command climates at installations and ships across the Total Force. Through on-the-ground quantitative and qualitative data collection efforts, OSIEs provide senior leaders with rich, contextualized information on risk and protective factors that have

the potential to impact command climate. During the several-day site visits, multidisciplinary OSIE teams consisting of Service members and DoD civilian employees conduct focus groups and interviews, administer surveys, and observe prevention forums. Data are collated and scored along nine dimensions reflecting the maturity of a site's integrated primary prevention capabilities. With this information, leaders are empowered to take early action to address common—less visible—problems and promote best practices that mitigate readiness degradation.

In 2021, sites were selected based on DEOCS scores aggregated to the installation level, ensuring representation from all Military Services and accounting for COVID-19-related travel restrictions. Following the 2021 site visits, the Department took action aimed at creating a strong foundation for prevention capabilities and establishing a baseline prior to the implementation of the Secretary-of-Defense-approved Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military (IRC-SAM) recommendations (DoD, 2021). Pursuant to DoDI 6400.11 (2022), OSIEs are conducted every other year. However, in 2024 the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed follow-up visits to sites visited in 2021 to assess progress since the initial visits. The 2024 OSIE reassessment examined implementation of the 2021 OSIE recommendations, long-term IRC-SAM implementation, and changes in DEOCS scores from 2021-2023. Appendix B serves as the Department's 2024 OSIE reassessment summary, outlining key takeaways and findings from the 2024 OSIE.

The 2024 reassessment identified that prevention capabilities had matured across all Military Departments, with greatest gains where collaborative and equipped prevention personnel were in place. Prevention capabilities matured more slowly in complex, joint, and remote locations, a focus of the 2025 OSIE visits. Across sites, four critical themes emerged during the 2024 site reassessments, described in more detail in Appendix B:

- 1. The IPPW needs access to data to inform prevention activities.
- Resources are competing and duplicative in environments with multiple assets.
- 3. Service culture influences command climate.
- The Department must seek to better understand quality of life indicators in relation to prevention of harmful behaviors.

To address these themes, the Department is continuing to develop the IPPW functional community, ensuring they have access to evidence-based resources and tools. Findings also confirmed the prevention infrastructure (e.g., Service instructions, data sharing forums) is not entirely in place. All 2021 foundational actions must be complete before sites can truly improve the fidelity of prevention efforts.

The 2025 OSIEs specifically investigate these themes identified in the 2024 reassessment to better understand their causes and potential solutions. Progress at 2021 sites demonstrated during the 2024 reassessment cycle exemplify the power that targeted assessments, and tailored solutions, can have on improving command climate and preventing harmful behaviors. However, sustained attention and effort are required to identify and address further areas of improvement.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> The full OSIE methodology is described in detail in the "2021 On-Site Installation Evaluation Report" available on prevention.mil.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Since 2021, site selection methodology evolved to use a five-factor Resilience Index, which summarizes a range of risk and protective factors across the social ecology related to harmful behaviors.

### 2.5 Summary of Command Climate Findings

CCA tools and OSIEs provide the Department with a comprehensive, multilevel analysis of command climate. Topics relevant to leadership behavior were prominent in the DEOCS and DOCP topic analysis results. These products highlighted areas needing improvement across the force, including passive unit leadership. However, these results also showcase strengths, such as supportive immediate supervisors and non-toxic NCOs/SELs. These strengths can and should be leveraged to advance solutions for other reported issues, such as low morale and high stress. Similarly, OSIE findings point to difficulties in environments when leadership responsibilities and oversight are unclear or overlapping. These findings underscore the role that leaders have in perpetuating Service cultures that, ultimately, impact command climate. Taken together, these data point to the central role of leaders in creating and maintaining strong command climates that foster the environment needed to achieve maximum mission readiness.

### 3 Understanding Trends & Issues

Analyzing patterns and trends within command climate data allows for targeted interventions where they are most needed across the Total Force. Furthermore, in-depth research and evaluation of identified issues ensure these interventions are as effective as possible.

### 3.1 Military Service Academies: Outliers for Risk

Aggregated DEOCS data provides valuable insights into Component-specific trends, signaling opportunities for focused action. Most notably, the MSAs are outliers for risk on not only factors flagged as comparatively high or low across the Total Force (e.g., *Morale, Stress, Passive Leadership (Commanders), Racially Harassing Behaviors)*, but were also higher in risk on some unique factors (e.g., *Work-Life Balance, Sexually Harassing Behaviors, Sexist Behaviors)*. However, many of these factors have improved over the last three years,<sup>21</sup> mirroring trends in similar surveys such as the Service Academy Experiences Survey (SAES) (DoD, 2025).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> OPA published the first DEOCS Aggregations in 2022. Comparisons across 2022-2024 are not presented at the Total DoD or Service-level because weighting was not introduced until 2024. The presentation of MSA trends is uniquely viable because the 2024 weighting of the MSA results is comparable to the roster size adjustment applied to the 2022 and 2023 MSA DEOCS.




Figure 4: MSA DEOCS Protective Factor Ratings Over Time

Figure 4 above shows favorable ratings at the MSAs for *Morale, Fairness, and Work-Life Balance* varied from 2022-2024, with *Fairness* staying relatively consistent between 2023 and 2024. Figure 5 shows unfavorable ratings for *Sexually Harassing Behaviors* dropped substantially between 2022 and 2023. *Racially Harassing Behaviors and Sexist Behaviors* had more modest decreases, with all three remaining relatively stable between 2023 and 2024. However, decreased *Morale* and *Fairness* and increased *Stress* between 2023 and 2024 demonstrate sustained attention on the climate at MSAs is warranted.<sup>22</sup>




Figure 5: MSA DEOCS Risk Factor Ratings Over Time

Trends on the MSA DEOCS mirror trends in similar metrics from other data sources. For example, according to the 2024 DoD Annual Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the MSAs, the estimated

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> As noted above, no analysis was conducted to determine if differences year to year are statistically significant.

prevalence rate of unwanted sexual contact statistically significantly decreased between Academic Program Year (APY) 2021-2022 and APY 2023-2024 from 21.4% to 13.3% for academy women and from 4.4% to 3.6% for academy men. Similarly, estimated prevalence of sexual harassment decreased to 51% for academy women (down from 63%) and 17% for academy men (down from 20%) over the same time period (DoD, 2025). The Military Service Academy Climate Transformation Task Force (MSA CTTF), discussed below, is the primary mechanism through which the Department has taken action to drive positive change on these important issues.

### 3.1.1 Military Service Academy Climate Transformation Task Force (MSA CTTF)

Between the APY 2021-2022 and APY 2023-2024 Service Academy Gender Relations reports, the Department mobilized to improve command climates at the MSAs.<sup>23</sup> The DoD specifically focused on understanding the unique environments at the MSAs and translating these findings into targeted solutions.

In August 2023, the Secretary of Defense released the memorandum "Actions to Transform the Climate and Help Prevent Harmful Behaviors at the U.S. Military Service Academies," directing the MSAs to execute several critical actions to address and prevent harmful behaviors. One of these actions directed the formation of the MSA CTTF. This task force, composed of senior military and civilian personnel from each Military Department and MSA, along with other members of DoD leadership, aims to improve and enhance collaboration on climate and integrated prevention efforts at the MSAs.

The MSA CTTF began meeting regularly in September 2023, to provide feedback to the Military Departments and DoD leadership on developing, implementing, and evaluating plans of action to ensure best practices are adopted across the MSAs. The group also provides critical oversight to achieve key milestones in a timely manner and, to date, all MSAs have implemented immediate actions directed by the CTTF.

The MSA CTTF has been integral to guiding the Military Departments and MSAs in transforming command climate and leadership development, enhancing integrated prevention efforts to better prepare cadets and midshipmen to lead our nation's defense. The latest progress reports were delivered in early August 2024 and indicate forward momentum and continued commitment on behalf of Military Department leadership.

The Department must continue to prioritize prevention efforts, support for help-seeking, and accountability measures to ensure long-term, meaningful change. The leadership and commitment provided by the Military Departments to transform command climate and enhance character development at the academies will be crucial to that effort.

#### 3.2 Research and Evaluation to Understand Identified Issues

Understanding unit and organizational needs while equipping leaders with proven tools are essential steps in addressing factors that impact command climate. For example, there are many reasons why someone may indicate their unit/organization morale is low, including factors like operational tempo, challenging missions, issues at home, poor leadership, and mental health challenges. Additionally, environments that cause some to thrive may cause others to decline. For example, some may find deployment engaging and fulfilling, while others find it stressful and draining.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Prior to 2025, OPA research products used the term "gender" to describe men and women. These groups were defined using survey items and/or administrative data categories for "male" and "female"; therefore, references to gender should be understood to mean "sex".

In the interest of gaining a full understanding of their command climate, commanders/leaders are required to elucidate unit-level DEOCS results by supplementing findings from other sources of data. For example, focus groups can reveal specific issues that may be driving the DEOCS ratings and be used to crowdsource possible solutions. Similarly, the qualitative data collected during OSIE visits contextualizes and clarifies aggregated DEOCS quantitative results. Evidence from the 2024 site visits consistently highlighted these themes related to several DEOCS factors identified as potential issues:

- **High Stress:** Service members face significant challenges related to inadequate housing, insufficient childcare, and limited spousal employment, which negatively impact their quality of life and operational readiness. These issues cause stress beyond what Service members are expected to endure as a function of their high-pressure jobs defending the United States. When these issues remain unresolved for sustained periods of time, they can cause levels of stress detrimental to Service members' performance and, ultimately, force readiness.
- Low Fairness: Resource disparities and perceptions of favoritism were commonly reported in complex environments where multiple Military Services coexist (e.g., joint bases, installations with tenant units). Members from one Military Service or command often felt subordinate to others, as resources were not always available to all Service members on the installation. These perceptions of unfairness can lead to resentment and distrust, reducing Service members' commitment to the mission.
- Low Morale: Service culture on installations heavily influences command climate at all levels of leadership. For example, junior Service members described leadership responses to traumatic events, such as deaths by suicide, as emotionally distant, fostering perceptions of a lack of empathy on the part of their leaders. These Service norms, like remaining stoic in the face of adversity, backfired by giving Service members the perception leaders do not care about what happens to them, contributing to decreased morale during already difficult times.

2025 OSIEs have delved further into these identified issues and have examined how complex environments create unique hardships on services like healthcare, off-base housing, schooling, and spousal employment, and will offer recommendations to improve access to these resources.

### 4 Empowering and Supporting Local Leaders

As with command climate oversight tools discussed above, the Department's strategy for improving command climate also centers on empowering leaders to take action within their sphere of influence. Although data like DEOCS aggregations point to overarching trends and areas for concentrated effort, developing effective and efficient action requires understanding the unique ways those issues manifest in individual units or organizations. Thus, Department capabilities aim to provide leaders with the information, resources, and tools they need to identify and implement tailored, evidence-based, and experience-informed solutions to improve command climate.

### 4.1 Integrated Primary Prevention Workforce

The IPPW is a new capability available for local leaders to enhance their command climate. The IPPW was established by Section 549A of the NDAA for FY20, to prevent harmful behaviors including suicide, sexual assault, harassment, domestic abuse, and child abuse and are aligned at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels (Pub. L. No. 116-92, 133 Stat. 1198 (2019)).

Pursuant to DoDI 6400.11 (2022), the IPPW provide support to leadership in key areas, including:

- Data collection and prevention research;
- Specialized support and expert guidance;
- Integrated primary prevention activity implementation;
- · Continuous evaluation and improvement; and
- Sustained community partnerships.

### 4.1.1 Hiring and Outreach for the IPPW

In accordance with Section 549B(b) of the NDAA for FY22, the Department has successfully created a workforce model for the IPPW. To implement that workforce, the Department established a direct hiring authority, created position descriptions, and is overseeing the accession of the IPPW throughout the Department. Between the beginning of the IPPW program in 2022 and the end of CY 2024, the Military Departments have hired more than 1,400 IPPW personnel across the force and will continue to move forward with a right sized workforce to ensure leaders at all levels are supported.

DoD participated in numerous outreach engagements which allowed the Department to connect with thousands of public health professionals and decision makers, providing opportunities to raise awareness and visibility for IPPW. The Department also created a LinkedIn page (DoD, n.d.), sharing upcoming events with the IPPW community, highlighting successes within the community, and advertising job opportunities for prospective new hires. Additionally, DoD successfully established an IPPW pipeline with civilian colleges and universities. In conjunction with the Partnership for Public Service, the Department also piloted an IPPW Internship Program during the Summer and Fall (2024), providing 45 student-learning opportunities for Masters-level students with subject matter experts across the Department over a 10–12-week period.

### 4.1.2 DoD Credentialing Program for Prevention Personnel

In 2023, aligned with requirements outlined in Section 549B(b)(2)(D) of FY22 NDAA,the Department established the DoD Credentialing Program for Prevention Personnel (D-CPPP), a first-of-its-kind credential for IPPW personnel. The June 13, 2022, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness memorandum, "Implementation of a Dedicated Primary Prevention Workforce Model," initiated the establishment of the D-CPPP to promote a consistent and qualified workforce across DoD. D-CPPP ensures the workforce meets the initial qualification requirements and continuing education to maintain expertise. This program prepares the workforce to implement integrated primary prevention across military communities and benefits the workforce by being transferable across DoD. By the end of CY 2024, DoD awarded approximately 1,000 IPPW credentials and 70 prevention support (collateral duty) credentials.

### 4.1.3 Training the IPPW

Ongoing learning is essential for a specialized workforce to maintain and enhance its skills, adapt to evolving research, and ensure effective and efficient practice. Many IPPW personnel come from formal social science backgrounds, but foundational training ensures a shared understanding of the DoD prevention system and process. Resources were also provided for those who desired further training and ongoing education. In FY 2024, the DoD provided numerous prevention-focused education and training opportunities to the prevention workforce throughout the DoD enterprise, in alignment with the Department's integrated primary prevention framework and goals outlined in the PPoA 2.0, DoDI 6400.09 (2020), and DoDI 6400.11 (2022). Below are *select* prevention-focused education and training efforts that occurred in FY 2024.

- SPARX Knowledge Prevention of Harmful Behaviors in the Military: This course covers the
  integrated primary prevention of harmful behaviors to establish a common base of knowledge,
  skills, and resources within the prevention workforce for selecting, implementing, and evaluating
  research-based prevention activities.
  - SPARX Knowledge Prevention of Harmful Behaviors in the Military, Instructor-Led Version: DoD conducted 14 sessions of the 10-day, 60-hour virtual instructor-led option of the Prevention of Harmful Behaviors in the Military course. In FY 2024, 459 participants completed this instructor-led option.
  - SPARX Knowledge Prevention of Harmful Behaviors in the Military, Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) Version: In FY 2024, DoD launched a virtual, asynchronous version of the Prevention of Harmful Behaviors in the Military course. The full course curriculum consists of 11 subordinate, connected courses in JKO and a final assessment. In FY 2024, 196 participants completed this asynchronous option.
- CCA and CIPP Plan Courses: In FY 2024, DoD launched the CCA and CIPP Plan courses in JKO to support requirements outlined within DoDI 6400.11. The CIPP Plan course provides information and resources on developing a CIPP Plan in accordance with DoDI 6400.11 requirements. The CCA course provides an understanding of how to administer, interpret, and/or consult on CCAs, including administering and interpreting results of the DEOCS. In FY 2024, 2,403 participants completed the CIPP Plan course, and 6,090 participants completed the CCA course.
- Prevention Webinars: DoD provided 10 prevention webinars throughout FY 2024, with additional webinars provided by the Military Departments to their IPPW. Topics included adverse childhood experiences, substance misuse, CIPP Plans, instructional skills, collaborations, communicating with leaders, the D-CPPP credential, and evaluation. DoD-led webinars reached a total of 2,412 attendees and remain available through JKO. All prevention webinars are eligible for IPPW Continuing Professional Education hours. <sup>24</sup>
- SPARX Connection: In accordance with DoDI 6400.09 (2020), SPARX Connection is a community of practice that fosters collaboration and learning among DoD prevention professionals. During FY 2024, the community grew to more than 3,000 members, with participation from all Military Services, including the National Guard, and the Coast Guard. SPARX Connection members have access to prevention resources and webinars from a variety of policy areas and virtual networking events for IPPW members to further connections.
- Prevention Peer Learning Community (PLC): DoD hosted four PLC sessions with select Army Integrated Prevention Advisory Group Prevention Specialists. Throughout these engagements, PLC members discussed fostering collaborations, conducting needs assessments, CCAs, CIPP Plans, and data informed actions.
- Service/Component Specific Integrated Prevention Training and Education Efforts: The Military Services managed numerous tailored training and education efforts to increase knowledge, cooperation, and integrate prevention efforts among strategic, operational, and tactical prevention system leaders across specific Service and military communities.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> All webinars currently available on JKO have been reviewed for compliance with the January 20, 2025, Executive Orders, "Ending Radical and Wasteful Government DEI Programs and Preferencing," and "Defending Women from Gender Ideology Extremism and Restoring Biological Truth to the Federal Government."

### 4.1.4 Facilitating Technical Assistance for the IPPW

DoD technical assistance helps to bridge knowledge and skill gaps between training and execution of primary prevention activities and provide targeted support to units and organizations with a specific need. The Department hosts a center that provides technical assistance to build the capacity of the IPPW to prevent harmful behaviors and evaluate implemented prevention activities.

The DoD Prevention Technical Assistance Center (PTAC) provides targeted support focused on integrated primary prevention planning, implementation, and evaluation of prevention activities. PTAC support for prevention planning and implementation includes offerings such as engaging key collaborators, assessing needs, setting goals, selecting prevention activities, implementing and adapting activities, defining outcomes, and evaluation planning. PTAC support for evaluation of prevention activities includes conducting evaluability assessments, designing evaluations, implementing and analyzing evaluations, and interpreting and disseminating findings. Center resources are available to anyone in DoD requiring support with primary prevention focused activities or evaluation around the prevention of harmful behaviors.

Below are select prevention-focused technical assistance accomplishments that occurred in FY 2024.

- **Direct Technical Assistance:** These opportunities provided one-on-one feedback to prevention personnel who need assistance with a specific prevention activity. Support was provided through phone calls, emails, virtual meetings, and the development of products. Examples included:
  - Connected leaders with on-demand primary prevention subject matter expert consultation and customized support through advice and guidance (i.e., Q&A, informal written recommendations), provision of draft content examples and resources (i.e., language suggestions, templates, literature, or resource links), and identification of needs for strategic prevention planning.
  - Providing targeted support through the provision of job-aid products (i.e., information papers, resource guides, how-to manuals, templates, checklists) to address identified knowledge, skill, or ability gaps and workforce product needs that were observed among prevention workforce personnel.
- **Group Technical Assistance:** These opportunities facilitated skill-building through group learning events and workshops that targeted specific technical assistance needs. Examples included:
  - Providing prevention-related group learning for individual Military Services/Components and targeted IPPW audiences to address specific knowledge, skill, or ability gaps. These hybrid events provided up to four hours of group learning centered around a specific prevention theme.
  - O Hosting cross-Service in-person or virtual group workshops focused on skill building through active participation exercises and problem-solving real-world challenges. These events provided up to three hours of instruction and topics were based upon needs identified through previous technical assistance engagements with the Military Services/Components.
- **Service-Level Technical Assistance:** These opportunities led by Military Services tailored problem-solving assistance for Service commands. Examples included:
  - Providing Service specific technical assistance calls. The Military Services conducted group, and individual technical assistance calls to provide support to their IPPW and

commands. These calls provided Service-specific guidance that tailored Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) products and support to unique Service-level requirements. These calls helped to streamline efforts for effective DEOCS, CCA, and CIPP Plan development and implementation.

#### 4.1.5 Evaluation of the IPPW

The Department is conducting an evaluation of the effectiveness of the IPPW's implementation across the force. The evaluation is assessing the fidelity of IPPW implementation through a variety of research activities, such as reviews of plans, materials, activities, and surveys. This initial iteration of IPPW evaluation will conclude in 2025 and will inform further future evaluations.

### 4.2 Comprehensive Integrated Primary Prevention Plans

CIPP Plans provide a blueprint for prevention efforts within a military community. These plans contain a tailored, evidence-based plan of action for the community's leaders and prevention personnel to improve their command climate. Additionally, CIPP Plans describe how the IPPW will implement their duties outlined in section 549B of FY 2022 NDAA, and DoDI 6400.11.

DoD launched the CIPP Plan system, a web-based file upload system, in early 2024, allowing IPPW across the Total Force to upload their completed CIPP Plans. The following overview summarizes the information collected in the CIPP Plan System for the initial CIPP Plans registered and submitted in 2024. Note that because each Military Service defines "military community" independently, some CIPP Plans represent an entire installation, and others represent a command or echelon. As a result, comparisons of the number of initial CIPP Plans across Components are not representative of the degree of compliance.

As shown in Figure 6, a total of 177 initial CIPP Plans were submitted in 2024,<sup>25</sup> with most (111, 63%) representing Active Component communities, 35% (62) from Reserve Component/National Guard communities, and the remaining 2% (4) from DoD civilian communities.

As with the DOCP, the content and format of CIPP Plans are highly specific to the individual military communities. However, each plan has several basic requirements. Data—including CCA findings—are

Reserve
Component/
National
Guard,
62, 35%

Active
Component,
111, 63%

Figure 6: 2024 CIPP Plans Submitted (N, %)

the starting point for CIPP Plans. CIPP Plans describe the community's strengths and areas of improvement, identifying targeted actions to be carried about by unit commanders and organizational leaders at each echelon.

Patterns in topics addressed in CIPP Plans provide evidence of how the IPPW and military leadership are working to improve command climate. Notably, 85% of initial CIPP Plans addressed stress, corresponding with high level of unfavorable DEOCS scores on the topic. Connectedness (65%) and leadership support (63%) were also commonly addressed CIPP Plan topics. Although the prevalence of these topics in CIPP Plans does not necessarily reflect their severity or level of concern within the units submitting data, these

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Data range from January 1 to December 31, 2024.

trends can be helpful to understand what commanders/leaders and prevention staff are targeting in their units/organizations and where resources and tools should be developed.

### 4.3 OSIEs: Indicators of Progress from 2021 to 2024

From 2021 to 2024, OSIE site visits informed tailored recommendations for enhancing command climate and prevention capabilities. Military Departments implemented these recommendations, customizing their approach to align with their unique needs and resources. Empowered by OSIE insights and supported by their chain of command, local leaders implemented targeted improvements aligned with their specific environments and operational dynamics. The 2024 OSIE reassessments showcase the transformative impact of the initial 2021 evaluations. Revisited sites demonstrated remarkable progress, underscoring the power of equipping capable leaders with evidence-driven resources, tools, and support.

### 4.3.1 Stress: Addressing Quality of Life Challenges

In 2021, OSIE visits underscored the importance of establishing formal processes to monitor and address stressors affecting Service members, including regular check-ins. Responding to these findings, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson and Fort Wainwright, AK, addressed challenging environmental conditions and a rise in deaths by suicide between 2019 and 2021. The 11<sup>th</sup> Airborne Division Commanding General initiated the Army's Mission 100 Campaign, which included a community-based approach to prevention. This effort implemented multiple initiatives, such as winterizing motor pools, mandated wellness checks for all Soldiers, improved schedule predictability, and new financial incentives to serve in Alaska to support Soldier and family quality of life. Access to helping resources were prioritized by mobilizing Army Reserve chaplains, behavioral health providers, and surging Military and Family Life Counselors to address stress on the force.

During the 2024 OSIE reassessments, it was evident—and Service members indicated—stigma associated with help-seeking had been significantly reduced due to leadership's encouragement towards proactive help-seeking behaviors and alleviating stress among Service members. This initiative demonstrates the value of a disciplined, data-driven approach in creating targeted and effective solutions that prioritize the readiness and resilience of the force.

### 4.3.2 Fairness: Promoting Trust and Engagement

In 2021, OSIE findings revealed the need for leaders at all levels to enhance military community engagement to further strengthen unit cohesion and promote fairness. In response to this recommendation and other risk factor indicators, the Navy launched Culture of Excellence (COE), an initiative designed to advance and strengthen warfighters and teams. COE focuses on building "Great People, Great Leaders, and Great Teams" by aligning with the Navy's core values.

COE aims to cultivate resilient individuals and cohesive teams capable of innovation and mission success. As part of COE, the Navy introduced the Virtual Commanding Officer (CO) Suggestion Box, a tool aimed at promoting engagement and fairness. This platform allows Sailors to anonymously share their thoughts and opinions with their commanders, ensuring their voices are heard without fear of reprisal. To maintain confidentiality and encourage open communication, the system automatically deletes data every 90 days.

During the 2024 OSIE visits, Sailors and commanders praised the Virtual Commanding CO Suggestion Box, highlighting the tool's ability to provide a safe and impartial avenue for all ranks to contribute feedback

to leadership. The platform's transparency, with responses and actions often shared publicly, further fostered trust and accountability within the commands. By addressing a widespread command climate concern, the Navy demonstrated a commitment to fairness, dignity, and respect. Furthermore, the solution was scaled across all commands, reinforcing the importance of unity and operational strength.

### 4.3.3 Morale: Enhancing Leadership Responsiveness

In 2021, OSIE visits identified a critical need for leadership to prioritize authentic interactions and responsiveness to Service members to reinforce trust, accountability, and meritocracy. Aligned with the principles of restoring the warrior ethos and building cohesive teams through clear standards and shared purpose, Fort Bliss implemented the Ironclad Framework. This strategy is designed to enhance collaboration, improve communication, and utilize data to inform installation-level policies and programs.

As part of the Ironclad Framework, Fort Bliss made the Better Opportunities for Single Soldiers (BOSS) program a cornerstone of the installation's strategy. BOSS is a program that supports the overall quality of life for single Soldiers, single parents, and individuals geographically separated from their families. Using a data-driven approach, the Ironclad and BOSS program engages in targeted efforts to build community connection. Dedicating resources to this effort has enabled the program to flourish and reach maximum potential. Since the implementation of the program, the site reported a remarkable 200% increase in recreation and leisure event participation, earning multiple 2024 awards from U.S. Army Installation Management Command Directorate-Readiness and Headquarters, Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-9.

Ironclad's data-driven approach extends to targeted efforts like a recent initiative providing 160 junior Soldiers (E1-E5) with free access to golf, encouraging relationship-building, physical fitness, and community connection. These efforts reflect a disciplined focus on addressing the specific needs of Service members while upholding the principles of merit, accountability, and shared purpose. By prioritizing the well-being and engagement of Soldiers, the program strengthens unit cohesion and operational effectiveness, directly supporting the President's mission to restore trust in leadership, enhance readiness, and maintain America's position as the world's most lethal and unified fighting force.

### 5 Conclusion

The data is clear: a strong command climate is not just about morale; it is about maximizing the readiness of the U.S. military. The findings presented in this report, from the concerning levels of stress impacting our Service members, to the persistent issues of fairness and morale, underscore the critical need for a continued investment in fostering command climates that bolster, not hinder, our warfighting capabilities. By equipping leaders at every echelon with the tools, resources, and support they need to understand and address their unique challenges, DoD empowers champions to cultivate environments where every Service member can thrive.

Investing in initiatives like the IPPW and implementing data-driven solutions like those highlighted in the OSIE indicators of progress are not simply acts of care and concern, but strategic imperatives to build a more resilient, cohesive, and, ultimately, more lethal fighting force. The Fort Hood Independent Review Committee (2020) warned that focusing only on readiness without also fostering strong command climates leads to deleterious outcomes that significantly detract from the mission. The future of our national security depends on a military force that is not only expertly trained and equipped but is also empowered by a command climate that unleashes their full potential, ensuring they are ready to answer the call, whenever and wherever that call may come.

### 6 Acronyms List

AFB Air Force Base

APY Academic Program Year

BOSS Better Opportunities for Single Soldiers

CCA Command Climate Assessment

CIPP Plan Comprehensive Integrated Primary Prevention Plan

CO Commanding Officer
COE Culture of Excellence

CTTF Climate Transformation Task Force

CY Calendar Year

D-CPPP DoD Credentialing Program for Prevention Personnel

DEOCS Defense Organizational Climate Survey
DOCP Defense Organizational Climate Pulse

DoD Department of Defense

DoDI Department of Defense Instruction

FY Fiscal Year

IPPW Integrated Primary Prevention Workforce

IRC-SAM Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military

JKO Joint Knowledge Online MCB Marine Corps Base

MSAs Military Service Academies

MSA CTTF Military Service Academy Climate Transformation Task Force

NCO Non-Commissioned Officer

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act

NS Naval Station

NSF Naval Support Facility

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

OPA Office of People Analytics
OSIE On-Site Installation Evaluation

OUSD(P&R) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness

PLC Prevention Peer Learning Community

POAM Plan of Actions and Milestones
PPoA Prevention Plan of Action

PTAC Prevention Technical Assistance Center

SAES Service Academy Experiences Survey

SEL Senior Enlisted Leader
STOs Strategic Target Outcomes

SVT Site Visit Team

USAFR United States Air Force Reserve

USAG U.S. Army Garrison

USAR United States Army Reserve

USD(P&R) Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness

USMCR United States Marine Corps Reserve

USNR United States Navy Reserve

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### 8 Appendix A: 2024 Command Climate Assessment Metrics

### 8.1 Defense Organizational Climate Survey

The DEOCS is a unit/organization-level survey administered by OPA that assesses the attitudes and experiences of all military and civilian members across DoD. The chief purpose of the DEOCS is to provide commanders and leaders timely, accurate information on their command climate.

All military commanders and civilian organizational leaders are required to annually administer a DEOCS to their unit or organization as part of the Annual CCA specified in DoDI 6400.11 (2022) and in fulfillment of the NDAA<sup>26</sup> mandate. As the largest voluntary DoD survey fielded annually, over one million Service members, MSA cadets and midshipmen, and DoD civilian employees complete the DEOCS each year. Although massive in breadth, the DEOCS is highly localized in its impact.

#### 8.1.1 Measurement of Constructs

The DEOCS includes nine protective factors<sup>27</sup> (e.g., *Cohesion*) and nine risk factors (e.g., *Toxic Leadership*). Each factor is included in the DEOCS due to its association with one or more of six DoD strategic target outcomes (STOs): increased readiness, increased retention, and reduced racial/ethnic harassment/discrimination, sexual assault, sexual harassment, and suicide (Clare et al., 2022; Harcey et al., 2024).

#### **Protective Factors**

Protective factors are attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors associated with positive outcomes for organizations or units.<sup>28</sup> DEOCS protective factors include:

- **Cohesion:** The extent to which individuals in a workplace care about each other, share the same mission and goals, and work together effectively.
- **Connectedness:** An individual's closeness to their unit or organization and satisfaction with their relationship to, and support from, others in that unit or organization.
- **Engagement and Commitment:** The extent to which individuals find their work fulfilling and their commitment to their job and organization.
- **Fairness:** Perceptions that organizational policies, practices, and procedures, both formal and informal, regarding information sharing, job opportunities, and promotions are based on merit.
- **Leadership Support:** Perceptions that a leader builds trust, encourages goal attainment, promotes effective communication, and supports teamwork.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> The requirement for CCAs for DoD organizations is specified in the FY 2013 NDAA, Section 572, as amended by Section 1721 of the FY 2014 NDAA.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> The version of the DEOCS administered in 2024, DEOCS 5.1, contained "Inclusion" as a protective factor. In compliance with the January 20, 2025, Executive Order, "Ending Radical and Wasteful Government DEI Programs and Preferencing," this factor is not included in the current report.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> More information regarding the DEOCS protective factors is available in the Defense Climate Portal Survey Resource Center on prevention.mil.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> This factor measures perceptions of the respondent's immediate supervisor.

- **Morale:** The individual's confidence, enthusiasm, collective pride, and willingness to persist in the activities of the group, and also perceptions of their organization or unit's confidence, enthusiasm, collective pride, and willingness to persist in the activities of the unit or organization.
- **Safe Storage for Lethal Means:** An individual's willingness to keep a firearm safely stored (i.e., unloaded or in a secure storage container/device) if they had one in their living space.
- *Transformational Leadership*: The extent to which a leader is perceived to encourage, inspire, and motivate others to meet new challenges and accomplish tasks beyond what they felt was possible.<sup>30</sup>
- **Work-Life Balance:** An individual's perception that the demands of their work and personal life are compatible.

#### **Risk Factors**

Risk factors are attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors associated with negative outcomes for organizations or units.<sup>31</sup> DEOCS risk factors include:

- **Alcohol Impairing Memory:** How often, during the last three months, one was unable to remember what happened the night before due to drinking alcohol.
- Binge Drinking: How often one consumes five or more drinks on one occasion.
- **Passive Leadership:** The perception that a leader avoids decisions, does not respond to problems, fails to follow up, hesitates to act, and is absent when needed.<sup>32</sup>
- **Racially Harassing Behavior:** The experience or witnessing of offensive behaviors based on race or ethnicity that made the individual uncomfortable, angry, or upset.
- **Sexist Behaviors:** Prejudicial, stereotypical, or negative attitudes and opinions based on sex. This includes verbal and/or nonverbal behaviors that convey insulting, offensive, or condescending attitudes based on the sex of the individual.
- **Sexually Harassing Behaviors:** The experience of unwelcome sexual advances and offensive comments or gestures of a sexual nature.
- **Stress:** The feeling of emotional strain or pressure.
- *Toxic Leadership*: Perceptions that a leader disregards input, ridicules others, and has self-promoting tendencies. It also includes behaviors that are demeaning, marginalizing, and/or coercive.<sup>33</sup>
- **Workplace Hostility:** The degree to which individuals in the workplace act in a hostile manner towards others. This includes behaviors such as insults, sarcasm, or gestures to humiliate a member, as well as the perception of others interfering with an individual's work performance.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> For MSAs, *transformational leadership* captures perceptions of the respondent's commander only. For all other populations, this factor captures perceptions of the respondent's commander and senior NCO in separate aggregations.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> More information regarding the DEOCS risk factors is available in the Factor Rating Interpretation Guide in the Defense Climate Portal Resource Center on <u>prevention.mil</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> For MSAs, *passive leadership* captures perceptions of the respondent's commander only. For all other populations, this factor captures perceptions of the respondent's commander and senior NCO in separate aggregations.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> For MSAs, *toxic leadership* captures perceptions of the respondent's immediate supervisor only. For all other populations, this factor captures perceptions of the respondent's immediate supervisor and senior NCO in separate aggregations.

#### 8.1.2 Methodology Overview

The population of interest for the DEOCS includes all Active Component units, Reserve Component units, DoD civilian organizations, Joint Service units, and MSAs. The DEOCS is unique from other DoD-wide surveys in that, although it is a DoD-wide data collection, it is primarily administered at the unit/organization level. In addition, while OPA provides the survey infrastructure, overarching administration guidelines, and analysis and reporting functionalities, many administration details are determined and carried out by the Military Services and/or units/organizations themselves. For example, the Military Services determine the level at which DEOCS should be administered (e.g., brigade, battalion, company, or platoon level) and track commander/leader compliance with fielding surveys at the designated level.

All DoD unit commanders and organization leaders are required to administer a DEOCS annually. When the DEOCS is fielded, it functions as a census, such that all members of a unit/organization are required to be included in the DEOCS survey sample population.<sup>34</sup> While commanders/leaders must provide the entire population of their unit/organization the opportunity to take the survey, responding to the survey is voluntary. The DEOCS annual population frame can be considered to include all DoD military members, civilians, and MSA students who were registered for a DEOCS.<sup>35</sup>

#### **DEOCS Data Collection**

The 2024 DEOCS fielded from August 1 to November 30. Using OPA-provided infrastructure, each participating commander/leader registered their unit/organization to conduct a DEOCS during the fielding. This process included setting the data collection window<sup>36</sup> and providing a census of their unit's/organization's members, the unit's/organization's Military Service alignment, commander/leader name, and other unit features. When each unit's/organization's DEOCS data collection window started, respondents took the survey online by accessing OPA's DEOCS survey website. For each unit/organization, the DEOCS is typically fielded for four weeks within the annual fielding period. However, data collection was initiated and monitored at the unit/organization level and a unit/organization could extend data collection to improve their response rate. Within 72 hours to two weeks after a unit's/organization's DEOCS closed, results were analyzed, weighted, and summary metrics were provided to the unit/organization leaders. The threshold to evaluate DEOCS results was at least 16 complete responses.<sup>37</sup>

#### **DEOCS Weighting**

Starting in 2024, DoD weighted DEOCS results for each unit/organization using an industry standard process to account for potential systematic differences in features of those who did not respond. DEOCS weighting is consistent with the weighting processes used for other OPA surveys; however, DEOCS weighting is applied at the unit/organization level instead of to the Total Force population. Weighted DEOCS survey results produce estimates that are more representative of the unit/organization than results produced without weighting. DEOCS weighting is applied using key demographic variables of interest,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Although the majority of units/organizations register to field a DEOCS, not all units/organizations comply with the annual DEOCS requirement. OPA is continuing work to help understand potential differences between units and the individuals in those units/organizations that participate in the DEOCS as part of an assessment of the generalizability of DEOCS results to the true DoD population.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Contractor personnel are not permitted to participate.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Each commander/leader could select the start and end date for data collection within the DEOCS annual fielding period that aligned with their unit's/organization's tempo.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> To protect respondent confidentiality, at least 16 participants must complete at least half of their DEOCS for the unit/organization to receive any DEOCS results.

such as Service and paygrade. The sum of weights for all respondents in a unit/organization will total to the size of the unit/organization listed in the DEOCS registration.<sup>38</sup> These participant weights are used in the calculation of unit/organization factor scores, as well as the aggregated estimates provided in this report. For each unit's/organization's DEOCS, the sum of weights for each response category is divided by the sum of weights for all response categories to calculate the weighted factor score.

#### 8.1.3 2024 DEOCS Aggregations

The DEOCS is designed as a unit/organization-level survey, meaning it is fielded and reported at the unit/organization level to provide actionable data to improve climate within a unit/organization. The DEOCS was not designed to provide aggregated data at higher organizational levels (e.g., Total DoD or Service) because the survey is not statistically sampled in a way that meets criteria to produce generalizable, aggregated data. For example, participants can opt not to respond, creating nonresponse error, or commanders could choose not to field a DEOCS, which contributes to potential coverage error. Any error in DEOCS estimates is generally present at the unit-level, but the amount of error—particularly coverage error—can compound in estimates at higher levels of aggregation. While there are methodological challenges to aggregating the unit/organizational-level DEOCS results, OPA conducted extensive analyses to develop an approach for combining DEOCS data across units/organizations to provide broader insights at higher DoD organizational levels.<sup>39</sup>

#### **DEOCS Aggregation Methodology**

The 2024 DEOCS aggregations are produced using the weighted unit/organization-level estimates. Each DEOCS can vary in size, with some unit/organizations having as few as 16 members, while others having as many as 12,000. DEOCS aggregations take each unit's/organization's size into account to produce more representative aggregated results, preventing smaller units/organizations from skewing the results. OPA's application of these calibrated weights facilitates the production of aggregated estimates that are representative of those registered, with reportable results, for a DEOCS at a given aggregation level, because it is the equivalent of calculating a weighted average.

The 2024 DEOCS aggregations are produced using the 10,629 DEOCS registrations for DoD units/organizations that had reportable results (i.e., registrations with at least 16 complete responses) during the 2024 annual fielding period.<sup>40</sup> Data used to create aggregated estimates rely on the registration-level weighted estimates of the 10,629 DEOCS registrations. While this report provides the aggregate

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> For example, if a registration had 50 members on the roster and 35 complete responses, after weighting, the total weighted sum would be 50. Weights are calculated using a model that utilizes multiple demographic characteristics of respondents and non-respondents simultaneously. A simplified example of this in practice can be demonstrated using a single demographic category. If the 50-person unit had 10 enlisted members (based on administrative data), and five completed the DEOCS, those five respondents would have a weight of 2, where each response represents the responses of two enlisted unit members.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> For more information on DEOCS aggregation methodology and registration-level weighting adjustments, see Defense Human Resources Activity, 2022, Busselberg et al, 2022 and the 2024 DEOCS aggregations report (forthcoming). Registration-level weighting adjusts for the size of the registration and each respondent has a different weight based on the attributes of themselves and respondents in their registration.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Population aggregations are limited to the Total DoD and defined as such based on their Service Component as selected during registration. Units registered as Coast Guard, therefore, are not included in the estimates presented here. Appendix A3 contains Coast Guard aggregation estimates.

factor scores for the DoD overall, there is known variation in the factor ratings at the individual unit/organization-level.<sup>41</sup>

#### **Defining Levels of Aggregation**

For the purposes of this report, Total DoD refers to the combination of the 10,629 reportable DoD DEOCS fielded in 2024. The Total DoD datapoint can be separated into lower levels of aggregation, such as Active Component, and within Active Component, the individual Military Services (e.g., Navy). The levels of aggregation presented in this report (see Table A1) are based on the organizational affiliation information provided for the unit/organization when the command registered to field their DEOCS.

When registering organizations for the DEOCS, commanders/leaders can identify their unit/organization as Joint Service, a DoD civilian organization, an Active Component Service, a Reserve Component Service, the National Guard, or an MSA. Each unit/organization may be comprised of individuals with different affiliations from the unit/organization overall. For example, a unit registered as Active Component Navy may include Active and Reserve Component Sailors, DoD civilians, and/or members of other Military Services. Although individual members of a unit/organization may have different affiliations from the unit/organization overall, their DEOCS responses are aggregated as part of the unit/organization with which they were registered and about which they were reporting. For example, a DoD civilian working in an Active Component Navy unit would be included in the aggregate estimates for Active Component Navy units because their DEOCS responses would be rating their Active Component Navy unit's climate and leadership directly.

#### **Aggregate Response Rates**

Within DoD, 10,629 units/organizations registered to complete a DEOCS during the 2024 fielding window and received a report. A total of 2,513,944 personnel were rostered across the 10,629 registrations and eligible to take the DEOCS.<sup>42</sup> While response rates for each unit/organization varied, the overall DoD response rate was 43%, resulting in 1,070,123 completed surveys. Table A1 includes five data elements:

- **DEOCS Aggregation Level:** Organizational affiliation of the unit/organization listed in the DEOCS registration used to identify the DEOCS aggregation level. All personnel on DEOCS registrations are aggregated based on the organizational affiliation identified in the unit/organization registration, regardless of their own personal affiliation.
- **Number of Registrations:** Number of reportable DoD registrations by each subcomponent in the 2024 fielding window.
- **Total Registration Size:** Number of personnel who were included on a roster for each aggregation level across all reportable DoD registrations.<sup>43</sup>
- **Complete Responses:** Number of individuals in reportable DEOCS registrations who provided a complete response to the DEOCS. To be a complete respondent, a participant must have answered at least half of the core questions on the survey.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Appendix A1 contains a summary of unit/organization factor score ranges across all 10,628 DEOCS registrations. <sup>42</sup> There is no authoritative, exhaustive list of units/organizations in the DoD to use to determine how many DEOCS registrations are expected in any given year or administration of the survey. It is also not possible to validate the roster of any given DEOCS registration and determine how many individuals are expected based on the units/organizations that have registered.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> A roster is ideally a full list of command personnel and is provided by the unit/organization survey administrator when registering a DEOCS. Each rostered person is eligible and invited to take the DEOCS for the given registration.

• **Response Rate:** Number of complete respondents divided by the total registration size for each population.

**Table A1. 2024 DEOCS Participation Survey** 

DEOCS Aggregation Level <sup>44</sup>	Number of Registrations	Total Registration Size	Complete Responses	Response Rate
Total DoD	10,629	2,513,944	1,070,123	43%
Joint Service	220	56,191	25,125	45%
DoD Civilian Organization	353	172,898	72,825	42%
Active	6,038	1,624,488	692,716	43%
Army	1,846	557,499	223,251	40%
Navy	1,357	461,313	193,712	42%
Marine Corps	439	171,304	80,678	47%
Air Force	2,271	419,093	187,763	45%
Space Force	125	15,279	7,312	48%
Reserve	1,412	247,701	81,642	33%
USAR	654	143,061	37,820	26%
USNR	174	26,839	9,283	35%
USMCR	55	24,370	11,322	46%
USAFR	529	53,431	23,217	43%
National Guard	2,556	398,725	190,737	48%
MSA	50	13,941	7,078	51%

#### 8.1.4 DEOCS Aggregation Results

Aggregated favorable and unfavorable weighted results for the 18 protective and risk factors from the 2024 DEOCS for the Total DoD and DoD Components registrations are summarized below.<sup>45</sup> Table A2 provides the top-line results for the Total DoD and its subcomponents while Table A3 and Table A4 aggregate results for the Active and Reserve Components by Military Service. The results for the DEOCS risk factors follow with Total DoD topline results in Table A5 and aggregation levels by Military Service in Table A6 and Table A7.

As this is the first presentation of weighted DEOCS aggregated estimates, the results provided in this report are descriptive summaries and do not employ statistical comparisons between populations or factors. OPA is exploring additional analyses to be included in future reports.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> The DEOCS aggregation level is based on the organizational affiliation of the unit/organization overall rather than individual unit/organization members.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> All DEOCS factor scores presented in this report are weighted.

#### **Protective Factor Results**

DEOCS protective factors can be categorized as having favorable, neutral, and unfavorable ratings. Higher favorable ratings on protective factors are linked to a higher likelihood of positive outcomes, such as improved performance or readiness and higher retention, as well as a lower likelihood of negative outcomes, such as suicide, sexual harassment, and sexual assault. For example, the three response categories for the *Cohesion* factor are:

- **Cohesive Organization:** Percentage of personnel indicating the unit/organization is cohesive, which is considered a favorable assessment.
- **Neutral:** Percentage of personnel indicating the unit/organization is neither cohesive nor non-cohesive, which is considered a neutral assessment.
- **Non-Cohesive Organization:** Percentage of personnel indicating the unit/organization is non-cohesive, which is considered an unfavorable assessment.

All protective factor aggregations present the favorable ratings for each of the factors. For example, Figure A1 shows that 73% of personnel in DoD units/organizations rated their unit/organization as cohesive. The protective factor scores indicate that most units/organizations are assessed favorably by their members. Among protective factors, *Morale* and *Fairness* received less favorable responses, which reflects comparatively more responses indicating the organizations were characterized by neutral or low morale and unfair treatment.




Figure A1. 2024 DEOCS Protective Factor Aggregations: Total DoD

#### 2024 DEOCS Protective Factor Aggregation Results: Total DoD and Components

Table A2 displays the favorable ratings of protective factors by DEOCS aggregation levels (i.e., Components). Some of these protective factors include attitudes or beliefs about relationships in their units or organizations, including *Cohesion*, *Connectedness*, and *Morale*. Among all DoD personnel, 73% rated their unit/organization as cohesive. Favorable *Cohesion* ratings appeared to show some variation across

Components, ranging from 70% for personnel in Active Component units/organizations to 79% for personnel in National Guard units/organizations and MSA cadets/midshipmen. For *Connectedness*, 77% of personnel in DoD units/organizations rated their unit/organization as highly connected. Favorable *Connectedness* factor scores for the different Components appeared to vary, ranging from 76% to 83%. For *Morale*, 46% of personnel in DoD units/organizations indicated high morale in their unit/organization. Among Components, favorable *Morale* factor scores range from 42% (MSA) to 55% (National Guard).

Table A2. 2024 DEOCS Protective Factor Favorable Rating Aggregations: Top-Line Results

DEOCS	DEOCS Aggregation Level <sup>46</sup>						
Protective Factor	Total DoD	Joint Service	DoD Civilian Organization	Active	Reserve	National Guard	MSAs
Cohesion	73%	75%	78%	70%	76%	79%	79%
Connectedness	77%	83%	83%	76%	80%	79%	77%
Engagement & Commitment	75%	80%	87%	73%	77%	76%	74%
Fairness	58%	58%	54%	55%	63%	65%	59%
Morale	46%	49%	46%	43%	54%	55%	42%
Safe Storage for Lethal Means	83%	85%	84%	82%	84%	81%	89%
Work-Life Balance	68%	74%	76%	65%	70%	72%	41%
Leadership Support (Immediate Supervisor)	84%	84%	84%	83%	85%	86%	88%
Transformational Leadership (Commander)	72%	68%	66%	71%	76%	77%	80%
Transformational Leadership (Senior NCO/SEL)	69%	59%	57%	67%	75%	76%	N/A

Other protective factors reflect attitudes or beliefs about the work itself and how it is organized, namely *Engagement and Commitment*, *Fairness*, and *Work-Life Balance*. In 2024, approximately 75% of personnel in DoD units/organizations rated their unit/organization as highly engaged and committed. The *Engagement and Commitment* factor scores across Components ranged from 73% (Active Component) to 87% (DoD Civilian Organizations). Overall, 58% of personnel in DoD units/organizations indicated there was fair treatment in their unit/organization. Across Components, *Fairness* factor scores ranged from 54% (DoD Civilian Organizations) to 65% (National Guard). Additionally, 68% of personnel in DoD units/organizations reported having a favorable work-life balance in their unit/organization. Across Joint Service, DoD Civilian Organizations, Active, Reserve, and National Guard Components, *Work-Life Balance* factor scores seemed to vary from 65% (Active Component) to 76% (DoD Civilian Organizations). However,

 $<sup>^{46}</sup>$  The DEOCS aggregation level is based on the Service selection of the unit/organization and may include a mix of personnel types within a registration.

41% of cadets/midshipmen across the MSAs reported having a favorable work-life balance at their academy.

Safe Storage for Lethal Means is a safety-related protective factor. Among personnel in DoD units/organizations, 83% reported that firearms would be safely stored. Safe Storage for Lethal Means factor scores appeared to vary across Components, ranging between 81% to 89%.

Finally, leadership-related protective factors were provided for immediate supervisors, commanders, and senior NCOs/SELs in their respective unit/organization. Note, the DEOCS commander is the commander/leader who registered the unit/organization to field the DEOCS and every member of the unit/organization provides information on that commander/leader; however, the NCO/SEL and immediate supervisor may vary across individuals within each unit/organization. For *Leadership Support* (*Immediate Supervisor*), 84% of personnel in DoD units/organizations rated their immediate supervisor as a supportive leader, and across Components, *Leadership Support* factor scores appear similar (83% or above). For *Transformational Leadership* (*Commander*), 72% of personnel in DoD units/organizations rated their commander/leader is a transformational leader. The favorable *Transformational Leadership* (*Commander*) factor ratings across Components ranged from 66% (DoD Civilian Organizations) to 80% (MSA). Similarly, for *Transformational Leadership* (*Senior NCO/SEL*), 69% of personnel in DoD units/organizations rated their unit's/organization's Senior NCO/SEL as a transformational leader. The *Transformational Leadership* (*Senior NCO/SEL*) factor scores ranged across Components, from 57% (DoD Civilian Organizations) to 76% (National Guard).

#### 2024 DEOCS Protective Factor Aggregation Results: Active Component

As shown in Table A3, personnel in Active Component units/organizations reported favorable ratings of protective factors that varied little across Military Services. For the relationship-oriented factor *Cohesion*, 70% of personnel in Active Component units/organizations rated their unit/organization as cohesive. Favorable *Cohesion* ratings seemed to vary across Active Component unit/organizations aligned to each Military Service (68% to 74%). For *Connectedness*, 76% of personnel in Active Component units/organizations rated their unit/organization as highly connected. The *Connectedness* factor scores across the Military Services ranged from 71% (Marine Corps) to 81% (Space Force) for the Active Component. For *Morale*, 43% of Active Component personnel indicated high morale in their unit/organization, and favorable *Morale* ratings seemed to vary minimally across Military Services (42% to 46%).

For the work-related factor of *Engagement and Commitment*, 73% of personnel in Active Component units/organizations indicated that their unit/organization is engaged and committed. *Engagement and Commitment* factor scores seemed to vary among Military Services (67% to 75%). Overall, 55% of personnel in Active Component units/organizations indicated there is fair treatment in their unit/organization, and *Fairness* factor scores varied minimally across Military Services (54% to 59%). For *Work-Life Balance*, 65% of personnel in Active Component units/organizations indicated having a favorable work-life balance within their unit/organization. Across all Military Services, the *Work-Life Balance* factor scores seemed to vary little (63% to 70%).

Overall, 82% of personnel in Active Component units/organizations reported that firearms would be safely stored. Further, *Safe Storage for Lethal Means* factor scores seemed to vary across Military Services (81% to 87%).

Table A3. 2024 DEOCS Protective Factor Favorable Rating Aggregations: Active Component

DECCE Protective	DEOCS Aggregation Level							
DEOCS Protective Factor	Active	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Space Force		
Cohesion	70%	69%	72%	68%	70%	74%		
Connectedness	76%	74%	75%	71%	80%	81%		
Engagement & Commitment	73%	73%	72%	67%	75%	75%		
Fairness	55%	54%	55%	57%	55%	59%		
Morale	43%	42%	43%	43%	45%	46%		
Safe Storage for Lethal Means	82%	82%	82%	81%	83%	87%		
Work-Life Balance	65%	63%	63%	63%	70%	68%		
Leadership Support (Immediate Supervisor)	83%	82%	82%	83%	85%	87%		
Transformational Leadership (Commander)	71%	69%	70%	73%	73%	74%		
Transformational Leadership (Senior NCO/SEL)	67%	68%	63%	72%	67%	65%		

Leader-related protective factors were rated for immediate supervisors, commanders, and senior NCO/SEL in their respective unit/organization. For *Leadership Support* (*Immediate Supervisor*), 83% of personnel in Active Component units/organizations rated their immediate supervisor as a supportive leader. *Leadership Support* factor scores appeared to vary little across Military Services, ranging from 82% to 87%. For *Transformational Leadership* (*Commander*), 71% of Active Component personnel rated their unit commander/organization leader as a transformational leader. The *Transformational Leadership* (*Commander*) factor scores varied minimally across Active Component Military Services, ranging from 69% to 74%. Similarly, for *Transformational Leadership* (*Senior NCO/SEL*), 67% of Active Component personnel rated their unit/organization senior NCO/SEL as transformational. The favorable *Transformational Leadership* (*Senior NCO/SEL*) factor ratings ranged from 63% to 72% across Active Component Service ranches.

#### 2024 DEOCS Protective Factor Aggregation Results: Reserve Component

Table A4 shows favorable protective factor ratings for the Reserve Component. For the relationship-oriented factor *Cohesion*, 76% of personnel in Reserve units/organizations rated their unit/organization as cohesive. Across Reserve Components, favorable *Cohesion* factor ratings appeared to vary little (75% to 82%). Similarly for *Connectedness*, 80% of personnel in Reserve units/organizations personnel rated their unit/organization as highly connected, and favorable *Connectedness* ratings across Reserve Components varied some (77% to 84%). For *Morale*, 54% of personnel in Reserve units/organizations personnel

indicated high morale in their unit/organization. The favorable *Morale* factor scores ranged from 49% to 58% across Components.

For the work-related factor *Engagement and Commitment*, 77% of personnel in Reserve units/organizations rated their unit/organization as engaged and committed. The favorable *Engagement and Commitment* factor scores ranged from 71% (USMCR) to 79% (USAFR). Among personnel in Reserve units/organizations, 63% indicated there is fair treatment in their unit/organization. *Fairness* factor scores seemed to vary across Reserve Components (62% to 68%). Additionally, 70% of personnel in Reserve units/organizations reported having a favorable work-life balance in their unit/organization. Favorable *Work-Life Balance* factor scores seemed to vary across Reserve Components, ranging from 66% to 72%.

Table A4. 2024 DEOCS Protective Factor Favorable Rating Aggregations: Reserve Component

DEOCS Protective		DEOCS Aggregation Level						
Factor	Reserve	USAR	USNR	USMCR	USAFR			
Cohesion	76%	75%	78%	82%	75%			
Connectedness	80%	78%	80%	77%	84%			
Engagement & Commitment	77%	78%	77%	71%	79%			
Fairness	63%	63%	67%	68%	62%			
Morale	54%	54%	57%	58%	49%			
Safe Storage for Lethal Means	84%	84%	85%	81%	86%			
Work-Life Balance	70%	71%	66%	67%	72%			
Leadership Support (Immediate Supervisor)	85%	84%	85%	89%	87%			
Transformational Leadership (Commander)	76%	73%	81%	78%	80%			
Transformational Leadership (Senior NCO/SEL)	75%	72%	80%	75%	78%			

Overall, 84% of personnel in Reserve units/organizations reported that firearms would be safely stored. *Safe Storage for Lethal Means* factor scores varied minimally across Reserve Components, ranging between 81% to 86%.

Leader-related protective factors were rated for immediate supervisors, commanders, and senior NCO/SEL in their respective units/organizations. For *Leadership Support* (*Immediate Supervisor*), among personnel in Reserve units/organizations, 85% indicated that their immediate supervisor is a supportive leader. *Leadership Support* (*Immediate Supervisor*) factor scores appeared to vary little across Reserve Components, ranging from 84% to 89%. For *Transformational Leadership* (*Commander*), 76% of personnel in Reserve units/organizations indicated that the commander of their unit/organization is a transformational leader. The *Transformational Leadership* (*Commander*) factor scores ranged from 73% to 81% across Components. Similarly, for *Transformational Leadership* (*Senior NCO/SEL*), 75% of personnel in Reserve

units/organizations indicated their unit/organization Senior NCO/SEL is a transformational leader. The favorable *Transformational Leadership* (Senior NCO/SEL) factor scores ranged from 72% to 80% across Components.

#### **Risk Factor Results**

Similar to the protective factors, most of the risk factors can be categorized as having favorable, neutral/less favorable, and unfavorable ratings. At the unit or organization level, higher unfavorable ratings on risk factors are linked to a higher likelihood of negative outcomes. For example, the *Alcohol Impairing Memory* risk factor has three categories:

- Frequent Memory Loss due to Alcohol: The percentage of unit/organization personnel indicating they experience frequent memory loss due to alcohol, which is considered the unfavorable category.
- **Some Memory Loss due to Alcohol:** The percentage of unit/organization personnel indicating they experience some memory loss due to alcohol, which is considered the less favorable category.
- **No Memory Loss due to Alcohol:** The percentage of unit/organization personnel indicating they experience no memory loss due to alcohol, which is considered the favorable category.

In addition to the risk factors with three categories of ratings, three risk factors are considered problematic behaviors and the results are dichotomized for presence (*Racially Harassing Behaviors*, *Sexually Harassing Behaviors*, and *Sexist Behaviors*). These results are presented as the percentage of respondents who indicate experiencing any behavior or did not experience any behavior. For example, the categories for the *Racially Harassing Behaviors* factor are:

- **Presence of Racially Harassing Behaviors:** The percentage of unit/organization personnel indicating experiencing at least one racially harassing behavior rarely, sometimes, or often. This is considered the unfavorable category.
- **No Presence of Racially Harassing Behaviors:** The percentage of unit/organization personnel indicating never experiencing any of the racially harassing behaviors. This is considered the favorable category.

All risk factor aggregations present the unfavorable response category for each of the factors, for each of the specified populations. For example, Figure A2 shows 1% of Total DoD responses indicated frequent memory loss due to alcohol and 17% of Total DoD responses indicated experiencing at least one racially harassing behavior rarely, sometimes, or often (i.e., they reported a presence of racially harassing behaviors). Overall, unfavorable ratings of DEOCS risk factors at the DoD level range from 1% (*Alcohol Impairing Memory*) to 42% (*Stress*).




Figure A2. 2024 DEOCS Risk Factor Aggregations: Total DoD

#### 2024 DEOCS Risk Factor Aggregation Results: Total DoD and Components

Table A5 shows the aggregate unfavorable ratings of risk factors for Total DoD and by DEOCS aggregation levels (i.e., Components). For *Stress*, 42% of personnel in DoD units/organizations indicated moderate/high levels of stress in their unit/organization. Unfavorable *Stress* varied across Components, ranging from 33% for personnel in Reserve and National Guard units/organizations to 45% for personnel in Active units/organizations; however, 65% of cadets/midshipmen at the MSAs reported moderate/high stress in their academy.

Alcohol-related risk factors include *Binge Drinking* and *Alcohol Impairing Memory*. Overall, 5% of personnel in DoD units/organizations reported frequent binge drinking. Across all Components, aggregate ratings of frequent binge drinking were under 6%. For *Alcohol Impairing Memory*, 1% of personnel in DoD units/organizations report frequent memory loss due to alcohol, and this seemed to be consistent across Components.

Risk factors related to harmful behaviors include *Workplace Hostility*, *Sexist Behaviors*, *Sexually Harassing Behaviors*. Overall, 14% of personnel in DoD units/organizations indicated experiencing frequent workplace hostility in their unit/organization. Unfavorable *Workplace Hostility* scores ranged from 10% to 18%. For *Sexist Behaviors*, 8% of personnel in DoD units/organizations reported the presence of sexist behaviors in their unit/organization. Across personnel in the Active and Reserve Components, DoD civilian organizations, National Guard, and Joint Service units/organizations, *Sexist Behaviors* factor scores seemed to show minimal variation (7% to 8%), whereas 26% of cadets/midshipmen at the MSAs reported the presence of sexist behaviors at their academy. Overall, 14% of personnel in DoD units/organizations reported the presence of sexually harassing behaviors in their unit/organizations. *Sexually Harassing Behaviors* factor scores seemed to vary little across Components (11% to 15%), however, 42% of cadets/midshipmen at the MSAs reported the presence of sexually

harassing behaviors at their academy. Additionally, 17% of personnel in DoD units/organizations reported the presence of racially harassing behaviors in their unit/organization. *Racially Harassing Behavior* factor scores ranged from 15% to 18% across Components. Among MSA cadets/midshipmen, however, 46% reported a presence of racially harassing behaviors at their academy.

Table A5. 2024 DEOCS Risk Factor Unfavorable Rating Aggregations: Top-Line Results

DEOCS Brotostive	DEOCS Aggregation Level								
DEOCS Protective Factor	Total DoD	Joint Service	DoD Civilian Organization	Active	Reserve	National Guard	MSAs		
Alcohol Impairing Memory	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%		
Binge Drinking	5%	3%	3%	5%	3%	4%	3%		
Racially Harassing Behaviors	17%	16%	17%	18%	15%	16%	46%		
Sexist Behaviors	8%	7%	8%	8%	7%	8%	26%		
Sexually Harassing Behaviors	14%	11%	11%	15%	12%	15%	42%		
Stress	42%	41%	42%	45%	33%	33%	65%		
Workplace Hostility	14%	13%	14%	15%	10%	11%	18%		
Passive Leadership (Commander)	17%	14%	16%	17%	18%	18%	20%		
Passive Leadership (Senior NCO/SEL)	13%	9%	10%	13%	14%	15%	N/A		
Toxic Leadership (Immediate Supervisor)	9%	8%	9%	9%	8%	8%	5%		
Toxic Leadership (Senior NCO/SEL)	5%	3%	3%	5%	5%	5%	N/A		

Leader-related risk factors were rated for immediate supervisors, the unit/organization commander, and the senior NCO/SEL in the unit/organization. Note, the DEOCS commander is the commander/leader who registered the unit/organization to field the DEOCS and every member of the unit/organization provides information on that commander/leader; however, the NCO/SEL and immediate supervisor may vary across individuals within each unit/organization.

Across personnel in DoD units/organizations, 17% rated their unit/organization commander as passive. *Passive Leadership (Commander)* scores ranged from 14% to 20% across Components.

When rating the senior NCO/SEL in their unit/organization, 13% of personnel in DoD units/organizations indicated they were a passive leader, and the *Passive Leadership (NCO/SEL)* factor ratings ranged from 9% to 15% across Components.

Overall, 9% of personnel in DoD units/organizations rated their immediate supervisor as a toxic leader. *Toxic Leadership (Immediate Supervisor)* factor scores across Components were all under 10%. When

rating their senior NCO/SEL in their unit/organization, 5% of personnel in DoD units/organizations rated them as toxic. The unfavorable *Toxic Leadership (NCO/SEL)* factor scores seemed to show little variation across Components, ranging from 3% to 5%.

#### 2024 DEOCS Risk Factor Aggregation Results: Active Component

Table A6 shows the unfavorable risk factor ratings of personnel in Active Component units/organizations, and there appeared to be some variation across the Military Services. For *Stress*, 45% of personnel in Active Component units/organizations indicated moderate/high stress in their unit/organization. Unfavorable *Stress* ratings varied from 41% to 49%.

Overall, 5% of personnel in Active Component unit/organizations reported frequent binge drinking, and across all Military Services, factor ratings of *Binge Drinking* were all under 8%. For *Alcohol Impairing Memory*, 1% of personnel in Active Component units/organizations indicated frequent memory loss due to alcohol, and this appeared to be consistent across all Military Services.

Table A6. 2024 DEOCS Risk Factor Unfavorable Rating Aggregations: Active Component

	DEOCS Aggregation Level							
Risk Factor	Active	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Space Force		
Alcohol Impairing Memory	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%		
Binge Drinking	5%	6%	6%	7%	3%	3%		
Racially Harassing Behaviors	18%	18%	21%	17%	16%	14%		
Sexist Behaviors	8%	9%	9%	8%	7%	6%		
Sexually Harassing Behaviors	15%	15%	17%	17%	12%	11%		
Stress	45%	43%	49%	41%	43%	47%		
Workplace Hostility	15%	17%	16%	17%	13%	11%		
Passive Leadership (Commander)	17%	18%	17%	19%	15%	13%		
Passive Leadership (Senior NCO/SEL)	13%	14%	13%	15%	11%	8%		
Toxic Leadership (Immediate Supervisor)	9%	10%	10%	10%	7%	6%		
Toxic Leadership (Senior NCO/SEL)	5%	5%	4%	5%	4%	2%		

Overall, 15% of personnel in Active Component units/organizations reported experiencing frequent workplace hostility in their unit/organization. Unfavorable *Workplace Hostility* scores ranged from 11% to 17%. Similarly, 15% of personnel in Active Component units/organizations reported the presence of sexually harassing behaviors in their unit/organization, and *Sexually Harassing Behaviors* factor scores ranged from 11% to 17% across all Military Services.

For Sexist Behaviors, 8% of personnel in Active Component units/organizations reported the presence of sexist behaviors in their unit/organization. Sexist Behaviors factor scores appeared to show little variation across Military Services (6% to 9%). Additionally, 18% of personnel in Active Component units/organizations reported the presence of racially harassing behaviors. Racially Harassing Behaviors factor scores ranged from 14% to 21% across Military Services.

Overall, 17% of personnel in Active Component units/organizations rated their unit's commander as passive. *Passive Leadership (Commander)* factor scores ranged from 13% to 19% across Military Services. When rating their unit's/organization's senior NCO/SEL, 13% of personnel in Active Component units/organizations rated them as a passive leader. *Passive Leadership (NCO/SEL)* factor scores seemed to vary across Military Services, ranging from 8% to 15%. Overall, 9% of personnel in Active Component units/organizations rated their immediate supervisor as a toxic leader. *Toxic Leadership (Immediate Supervisor*) factor across Military Services were all under 11%. When rating their unit/organization senior NCO/SEL, 5% of personnel in Active Component units/organizations rated them as a toxic leader. Finally, unfavorable *Toxic Leadership (NCO/SEL)* factor ratings appeared to show little variation across Military Services (2% to 5%).

#### 2024 DEOCS Risk Factor Aggregation Results: Reserve Component

Table A7 shows there appeared to be some variations in unfavorable risk factors ratings of personnel in Reserve Component units/organizations. For *Stress*, 33% of personnel in reserve units/organizations indicated moderate/high stress in their unit/organization, and unfavorable *Stress* scores ranged from 31% to 37% across Reserve Components.

Overall, 3% of personnel in reserve units/organizations reported frequent binge drinking, and across Reserve Components, factor scores for *Binge Drinking* seemed to show minimal variation (2% to 5%).

For *Alcohol Impairing Memory*, 1% of personnel on Reserve units/organizations reported frequent memory loss due to alcohol, and this appeared to be consistent across Reserve Components.

Table A7. 2024 DEOCS Risk Factor Unfavorable Rating Aggregations: Reserve Component

Risk Factor	DEOCS Aggregation Level						
RISK Factor	Reserve	USAR	USNR	USMCR	USAFR		
Alcohol Impairing Memory	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%		
Binge Drinking	3%	3%	3%	5%	2%		
Racially Harassing Behaviors	15%	15%	13%	13%	15%		
Sexist Behaviors	7%	8%	6%	5%	6%		
Sexually Harassing Behaviors	12%	12%	10%	12%	11%		
Stress	33%	33%	37%	31%	34%		
Workplace Hostility	10%	11%	8%	11%	10%		
Passive Leadership (Commander)	18%	19%	18%	20%	17%		
Passive Leadership	14%	15%	14%	15%	13%		

Risk Factor	DEOCS Aggregation Level						
RISK FACIOI	Reserve	USAR	USNR	USMCR	USAFR		
(Senior NCO/SEL)							
Toxic Leadership (Immediate Supervisor)	8%	8%	7%	8%	7%		
Toxic Leadership (Senior NCO/SEL)	5%	5%	4%	4%	5%		

Risk factors related to harmful behaviors appear similar to the DoD aggregate estimates. Overall, 10% of personnel in Reserve units/organizations indicated experiencing frequent workplace hostility in their unit/organization. Unfavorable *Workplace Hostility* scores seemed to vary minimally across Reserve Components (8% to 11%). Similarly, 12% of personnel in reserve units/organizations reported the presence of sexually harassing behaviors in their unit/organization. *Sexually Harassing Behaviors* factor scores appeared to show minimal variation across Reserve Components, ranging from 10% to 12%. For *Sexist Behaviors*, 7% of personnel in Reserve units/organizations reported the presence of sexist behaviors in their unit/organization. *Sexist Behaviors* factor scores seemed to vary minimally across Reserve Components (5% to 8%). Additionally, 15% of personnel in Reserve units/organizations reported the presence of racially harassing behaviors in their unit/organization, and *Racially Harassing Behavior* factor scores showed minimal variation, ranging from 13% to 15%.

Overall, 18% of personnel in Reserve units/registrations rated their unit's commander as passive. *Passive Leadership (Commander)* factor scores seemed to vary little across Reserve Components (17% to 20%). When rating their unit/organization senior NCO/SEL, 14% of personnel in Reserve units/organizations rated their senior NCO/SEL as a passive leader. *Passive Leadership (NCO/SEL)* factor scores, similarly, seemed to vary little across Reserve Components (13% to 15%). Overall, 8% of personnel in Reserve units/organizations rated their immediate supervisor as toxic. Across Reserve Components, *Toxic Leadership (Immediate Supervisor)* factor scores appear similar (7% to 8%). Finally, 5% of personnel in Reserve units/organizations rated their unit/organization senior NCO/SEL as a toxic leader. Unfavorable *Toxic Leader (NCO/SEL)* factor ratings appear similar (4% to 5%) across Reserve Components.

#### 8.1.5 2025 Enhancement: Data-Driven Factor Rating Alerts

The DEOCS system is designed to produce timely, automated reports for commands to assist with interpretation and actionability of results. One feature included in the reports is the factor rating alert, which indicates to commanders/leaders whether their unit's/organization's DEOCS factor rating scores are cause for concern. Alerts are based on normative thresholds, meaning commanders/leaders receive an alert based on their unit's/organization's DEOCS factor score relative to the scores of all other DoD units/organizations. These relative-risk alerts highlight protective and/or risk factors a commander/leader may want to address to promote readiness and retention.

While useful as a point of comparison to other organizations, the relative-risk factor rating alerts less directly represent the level of risk for harmful outcomes associated with the factor scores. Further, these alerts are susceptible to factor distribution shifts that may over- or under-identify factor scores that may need improvements. As an enhancement, OPA developed data-driven factor alert thresholds based on each DEOCS factor's empirical association with the Department's strategic target outcomes.<sup>47</sup> These data-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> The six strategic target outcomes include sexual assault, sexual harassment, retention, readiness, suicide, and racial/ethnic harassment and/or discrimination.

driven thresholds comprehensively represent factor scores that are significantly associated with elevated risk of harmful outcomes.

Enhancing command reports to include data-driven alerts has two key benefits. First, empirically defined thresholds are less subject to factor distribution changes, therefore, they more consistently alert units/organizations with an increased need for improvements. Second, by demonstrating relationships between climate factors assessed on the DEOCS and the DoD STOs, this approach emphasizes command climate as a prevention mechanism for reducing harmful behaviors. This emphasis can help the Department communicate the importance of the DEOCS as a tool for creating change. These data-driven thresholds are included on the 2025 annual DEOCS.

### 8.2 Defense Organizational Climate Pulse

The DOCP, like the DEOCS, is a unit/organization-level survey conducted by OPA that assesses the attitudes and experiences of all DoD military and civilian members. The chief purpose of the DOCP is to provide commanders/leaders with fully customizable, quick, and accurate information on their command climate. Unlike the DEOCS, which has core content assessing command climate on 18 protective and risk factors, the DOCP is a brief, fully customizable, organizational climate survey covering topics that are selected by commanders/leaders for their unit's/organization's survey.

The DOCP was launched in early 2024 after being established in DoDI 6400.11 as a CCA survey tool to be used outside of the DEOCS annual fielding period. Unit commanders or organizational leaders may field a DOCP voluntarily for any reason or may be directed by their leadership to administer a DOCP. For example, a DOCP may be administered as part of a Change of Command CCA or as a follow-up survey to collect information to address challenges identified during a unit's/organization's CCA. While the DOCP is a voluntary tool for commands, it provides a unique ability for immediate and targeted climate results to aide in prevention activities.

#### 8.2.1 Methodological Overview

The DOCP is administered at the unit/organization level and can be fielded from January to July upon request by commanders/leaders in all Active Component units, Reserve Component units, DoD civilian organizations, and MSAs. In near real-time, DOCP results are provided to units/organizations within 72 hours to 14 days of the survey close. The immediacy of these CCA results can aide in launching prevention efforts with little to no wait for commands. Whether due to a change of command, an implementation of a prevention activity, or to check in on a specific topic impacting force readiness, the DOCP offers a tailored data collection approach for units/organizations.

As with the DEOCS, OPA provides the DOCP survey infrastructure, overarching administration guidelines, and analysis and reporting functionalities. However, while the DEOCS is designed to measure key climate factors across the entire DoD, the DOCP is a unique combination of survey items selected by commanders/leaders from a curated pool of over 400 items across multiple topic areas. Commanders/leaders can select up to 15-closed-ended questions and one open-ended question from the curated pool of items to form the DOCP content. The bank is designed to be updated annually to reflect the Department's changing data needs. The 2024 DOCP item bank includes survey items and topics identified by DoD and Service policy offices as areas of interest. Table A8 summarizes the topics that are represented in the DOCP item bank.

Table A8. DOCP Closed-Ended Item Topics

Closed-Ended Item Keywords					
<ul> <li>Alcohol/Substance Use</li> <li>Cohesion</li> <li>Connectedness</li> <li>DEOCS<sup>48</sup></li> <li>Domestic Abuse</li> <li>Engagement and Commitment</li> <li>Fairness</li> <li>Sex</li> <li>Harassment/Discrimination</li> <li>Housing/Food Security</li> <li>Leadership</li> <li>Leadership Support</li> <li>Mental Health</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Morale</li> <li>Passive Leadership</li> <li>Prevention</li> <li>Race/Ethnic Issues</li> <li>Readiness</li> <li>Safe Storage for Lethal Means</li> <li>Safety/Well-Being</li> <li>Sexual Assault</li> <li>Stress</li> <li>Suicide</li> <li>Toxic Leadership</li> <li>Transformational Leadership</li> <li>Work-Life Balance</li> <li>Workplace Hostility</li> </ul>				

#### 8.2.2 2024 DOCP

Given both the newness and full customizability of the DOCP, aggregate estimates of climate cannot be elucidated by this data. However, the DOCP can be used to examine how many units/organizations leveraged the DOCP as a CCA tool. Additionally, the DOCP results can provide insight into the relevant topics of interest within teams. In 2024, there were 388 DoD units/organizations that opted to field a DOCP survey, covering 73,144 personnel in DoD units/organizations (Table A9). Across all DoD DOCP registrations, 31,220 participants completed a DOCP resulting in an overall response rate of 43%.

Table A9. 2024 DoD DOCP Summary

Registration Type	Total Number of Units Responding	Total Registration Size	Complete Respondents	Response Rate
Total DoD	388	73,144	31,220	43%
Joint Service	6	2,206	1,133	51%
DoD Civilian Organization	14	4,298	2,233	52%
Active	249	47,639	18,721	39%
Army	103	16,322	6,436	39%
Navy	24	3,881	1,483	38%
Marine Corps	20	10,436	3,503	34%
Air Force	99	16,802	7,185	43%

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> Items from the DEOCS were included in the DOCP bank.

Registration Type	Total Number of Units Responding	Total Registration Size	Complete Respondents	Response Rate
Space Force	3	198	114	58%
Reserve	67	8,944	3,576	40%
USAR	38	4,455	1,726	39%
USNR	1	420	97	23%
USMCR	1	700	399	57%
USAFR	27	3,369	1,354	40%
National Guard	51	9,950	5,541	56%
MSA	1	107	16	15%

Table A10 displays the number and proportion of registrations that selected DOCP items by topic. Each DOCP item may have up to three topics associated with it, for example a "Leadership" item may also be related to "Morale." While not mutually exclusive, a summary of the topics selected for DOCP provides insight into the areas of interest for commanders/leaders. For example, the top two topics covered in DOCP included leadership (97%)<sup>49</sup> and morale (91%). Note that frequency of selection does not reflect the importance of the topic. For example, the topics least frequently selected for DOCPs included items on safe storage of lethal means (1%) and domestic abuse (2%).

Table A10. Topics of Items Selected for 2024 DOCP Surveys

DOCP Topics	Number of DOCP Registrations	%
Cohesion	344	89%
Connectedness	270	70%
DEOCS	341	88%
Domestic Abuse	7	2%
Engagement & Commitment	325	84%
Fairness	265	68%
Sex	188	49%
Harassment/Discrimination	304	79%
Leadership	375	97%
Leadership Support	330	85%
Mental Health	236	61%
Morale	351	91%
Passive Leadership	154	40%

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> Leadership was both the topic with the most items in the DOCP and the topic most frequently selected by commanders/leaders for inclusion on their DOCP. The number of items in the bank did not drive the frequency of selection for inclusion on a DOCP. For example, morale and cohesion were frequently selected but were not the most common topics used in the DOCP bank.

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DOCP Topics	Number of DOCP Registrations	%
Race/Ethnicity Issues	121	31%
Readiness	299	77%
Safe Storage	4	1%
Safety/Wellbeing	137	35%
Sexual Assault	70	18%
Stress	178	46%
Substance Use	113	29%
Suicide	112	29%
Toxic Leadership	63	16%
Transformational Leadership	194	50%
Work-Life Balance	185	48%
Workplace Hostility	167	43%

### 8.3 Comprehensive Integrated Primary Prevention Plans

The purpose of this section is to describe the CIPP Plan registration system, the number of CIPP Plans submitted in 2024, and the topics covered by the submitted CIPP Plans (as identified during the registration process). DoDI 6400.11 requires commanders/leaders to adopt a preventative approach to addressing harmful behaviors in their CCAs to enhance readiness and mission execution capabilities.

A cornerstone of DoDI 6400.11 is the CIPP Plan, which is a tool used by commanders/leaders and IPPW to document planned integrated primary prevention-based activities to reduce risk factors and enhance protective factors. The intent behind CIPP Plans is to streamline and unify prevention activities across an organization, in this case, a military community, for the purpose of reducing and eliminating duplicative efforts towards the same goals.

To form a more comprehensive and actionable picture of command climate, CIPP Plans synthesize information from DEOCS unit-level results, as well as administrative records, reports, interviews, focus groups, or other existing datapoints. DoDI 6400.11 requires the Military Services to define the echelon (referred to as a community) at which a CIPP Plan is developed to maximize the effectiveness of the tool within each Military Service. For example, the Army defines "community" as a military installation, while the Navy defines "community" as a command or vessel.

All CIPP Plans include a needs assessment identifying areas for improvement within the community, specific goals regarding change, and the prevention activities planned to address the challenges within the community. DoDI 6400.11 requires that CIPP Plans be developed and submitted twice annually, which allows commanders/leaders the opportunity to develop their plans, report progress, and/or update their planned activities mid-year.

#### 8.3.1 CIPP Plan System

OPA was tasked with developing the CIPP Plan System, a virtual registration system and repository for CIPP Plans, which launched in mid-January 2024.

Designed to align with the requirements outlined in DoDI 6400.11, the CIPP Plan System collects data on top-line information via a "registration" of the CIPP Plan. The system OPA developed provides the infrastructure for submitting and archiving the CIPP Plans, but many details regarding the organization and content of the plans are determined and carried out by the Military Services. To provide standardized data on the CIPP Plans, OPA collects basic information common to all CIPP Plans as part of the plan registration and submission process. The common data elements include community location, commander name, the units/organizations comprising the community, and the topics addressed in the plan's needs assessment.

#### 8.3.2 2024 CIPP Plan Data Overview

The following overview summarizes the information collected in the CIPP Plan System for 2024. For the purpose of exploring the 2024 data, we limited our overview to the initial CIPP Plans received between January to December 2024.

Although DoDI 6400.11 stipulates that CIPP Plans are to be submitted twice annually, the Military Services were given additional time to respond to this new requirement in 2024. As a result, the CIPP Plan due date for the initial submission was delayed from January to March 2024. Additionally, the requirement for submitting an updated plan was made optional for the 2023 cycle.<sup>50</sup>




Figure A3. Daily and Cumulative Counts of 2024 Initial CIPP Plan Submissions

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> Per the exception to policy memorandum dated July 12, 2024, by Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness. In 2024, less than one quarter of communities that had uploaded an initial plan registered an updated version of their plan.

For 2024, 177 initial CIPP Plans were submitted for military communities across Active and Reserve Components, and DoD civilian organizations (Table A11). Each of the Military Services define "community" to be at different echelons. Thus, the number of plans submitted should not be compared across Components and does not reflect either the quality of the plans submitted or the degree to which the Component complied with the CIPP Plan requirement.

Table A11. Count of 2024 Initial CIPP Plan Submissions by Component

	Active	Reserve/ National Guard	Civilian	Total
Count of CIPP Plan Uploads	111	62	4	177

In addition to the overall number of plans and the timing of their submission, it is also possible to examine the proportion of plans addressing each topic area identified in the CIPP Plan registration process. The most common topics addressed in a majority of all initial 2024 CIPP Plans included stress, connectedness, and leadership support (Table A12). The least common topics were violent crime, stalking, and problematic sexual behavior in youth and children. Understanding the prevalence of these topics gives strategic-level leaders the insight into which issues are most frequently addressed in CIPP Plans. However, the frequency distribution does not indicate the level of concern individual communities might have about a topic. A table illustrating the proportions of topics covered by all initial CIPP Plans from 2024 can be found below.

Table A12. Proportions of Topics Covered by 2024 Cycle Initial CIPP Plans

Торіс	Percent of CIPP Plans
Stress	85%
Connectedness	65%
Leadership Support	63%
Sexually Harassing Behaviors	56%
Passive Leadership	55%
Racially Harassing Behaviors	55%
Cohesion	49%
Work-Life Balance	48%
Morale	45%
Relationship (e.g., peers, family, partner) Problems (e.g., loss of relationships, isolation)	40%
Transformational Leadership	39%
Social Skills	37%
Workplace Hostility	34%
Alcohol Use	33%
Mental Health (e.g., history of depression)	32%

Торіс	Percent of CIPP Plans
Engagement & Commitment	32%
Sexist Behaviors	32%
Fairness	30%
Collaboration	29%
Safe Storage of Lethal Means	25%
Toxic Leadership	24%
Financial Readiness	23%
Substance Use	22%
Norms	20%
Access to High-Quality Behavioral Health and Medical Services	20%
Health	8%
Child Neglect	6%
Violent Crime	3%
Stalking	3%
Problematic Sexual Behavior in Children and Youth	2%

### 8.4 Appendix A1: Unit/Organization Factor Score Ranges (Total DoD)

This appendix provides the unit/organization range of favorable and unfavorable scores for DEOCS protective and risk factors among all DoD registrations from the 2024 annual fielding. For example, Table A1-1 shows that 73% of personnel in DoD units/organizations rated their unit/organization as cohesive. At the individual unit/organizational-level, the percentage of personnel rating their unit/organization as cohesive ranged from 18% to 100%.

Table A1-1. 2024 DEOCS Protective Factor Favorable Unit/Organization Rating Ranges

Protective Factor	Total DoD Aggregation	Range of Unit/Organization Favorable Scores
Cohesion	73%	[18%, 100%]
Connectedness	77%	[42%, 100%]
Engagement & Commitment	75%	[28%, 100%]
Fairness	58%	[4%, 100%]
Morale	46%	[2%, 100%]
Safe Storage for Lethal Means	83%	[34%, 100%]
Work-Life Balance	68%	[6%, 100%]
Leadership Support (Immediate Supervisor)	84%	[37%, 100%]
Transformational Leadership (Commander)	72%	[18%, 100%]
Transformational Leadership (Senior NCO/SEL)	69%	[0%, 100%]

Table A1-2. 2024 DEOCS Risk Factor Unfavorable Unit/Organization Rating Ranges

Risk Factor	Total DoD Aggregation	Range of Unit/Organization Unfavorable Scores
Alcohol Impairing Memory	1%	[0%, 39%]
Binge Drinking	5%	[0%, 39%]
Racially Harassing Behaviors	17%	[0%, 63%]
Sexist Behaviors	8%	[0%, 55%]
Sexually Harassing Behaviors	14%	[0%, 61%]
Stress	42%	[3%, 89%]
Workplace Hostility	14%	[0%, 63%]
Passive Leadership (Commander)	17%	[0%, 60%]
Passive Leadership (Senior NCO/SEL)	13%	[0%, 100%]
Toxic Leadership (Immediate Supervisor)	9%	[0%, 49%]
Toxic Leadership (Senior NCO/SEL)	5%	[0%, 100%]

### 8.5 Appendix A2: Demographic Breakdown of Total DoD 2024 DEOCS Aggregations

This appendix provides the 2023 DEOCS protective and risk factor scores. These scores are aggregated across all DoD units/organizations in 2024. The data broken down by demographic category of respondents. The units and organizations in the Total DoD aggregations including Joint Service units, DoD Civilian Organizations, Active Component units, Reserve Component units, as well as MSA and MSA Preparatory Schools. Total DoD estimates do not include Coast Guard DEOCS data; Coast Guard-specific data can be found in Appendix A3: 2024 DEOCS Aggregations U.S. Coast Guard.

#### 8.5.1 DEOCS Reporting: Demographic Categories

The protective and risk factor tables (Table A2-1 and A2-2) present each row with an aggregate factor rating for each demographic group within the Total DoD. The demographic categories in these tables are based on respondent self-reported demographic characteristics. If a participant opted not to answer a given demographic question, it was not possible to add their responses to the breakout for that demographic.

All complete respondents were included in the overall numbers, whether or not they completed the demographic questions. For example, if a respondent from a unit registered with the Active Component of the Army chose not to answer if they were an officer or enlisted, their survey data was not included in the breakouts by Enlisted/Officer Status for the Active Component of the Army but were included in that population's overall numbers and in other demographic breakouts.

The demographic categories presented in the detailed population tables include:

- Race/Ethnicity: Respondents are classified based on self-reported categories consistent with requirements of the Standards for Maintaining, Collecting, and Presenting Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity (1997). Non-Hispanic White includes persons marking only White and not reporting being Spanish/Hispanic/Latino.<sup>51</sup> Racial/Ethnic Minority includes all persons marking one or more of the races other than White and/or marking that they are Spanish/Hispanic/Latino.
- Sex: This category includes Male and Female.<sup>52</sup>
- Military/Civilian Status: The tables presenting the aggregated estimates for units identified as
  Joint Service, DoD Civilian Organizations, Active Component, Reserve, and National Guard
  include the reporting categories of Military and Civilian. Military includes active duty, reservists,
  and National Guard members. Civilian includes people who identified as civilian employees. The
  Military category includes both Enlisted (E1–E9) and Officer (W1–W5 and O1 and above)
  paygrades

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> Persons marking White and another race are not included in this category.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> Categorization is based on the DEOCS survey item asking respondents "What sex were you assigned at birth, on your original birth certificate?"

Table A2-1. 2024 DEOCS Protective Factor Favorable Rating Aggregations: Total DoD by Demographic Categories

	Race/Ethnicity		Sex		Military/Civilian Status		Enlisted/Officer Status		
Protective Factor	Total DoD Aggregation	Non- Hispanic White	Racial/ Ethnic Minority	Male	Female	Military	Civilian	Enlisted	Officer
Cohesion	73%	75%	71%	75%	68%	72%	76%	70%	81%
Connectedness	77%	80%	74%	77%	78%	75%	83%	72%	85%
Engagement & Commitment	75%	76%	74%	75%	76%	72%	82%	70%	80%
Fairness	58%	60%	57%	60%	52%	58%	55%	56%	69%
Morale	46%	47%	47%	49%	42%	46%	48%	44%	56%
Safe Storage for Lethal Means	83%	82%	84%	81%	88%	82%	84%	81%	86%
Work-Life Balance	68%	67%	69%	68%	69%	63%	78%	64%	64%
Leadership Support (Immediate Supervisor)	84%	86%	83%	86%	80%	84%	84%	83%	89%
Transformational Leadership (Commander)	72%	72%	72%	74%	69%	74%	65%	73%	81%
Transformational Leadership (Senior NCO/SEL)	69%	68%	71%	71%	65%	73%	53%	73%	74%

Table A2-2. 2024 DEOCS Risk Factor Unfavorable Rating Aggregations: Total DoD by Demographic Categories

		Race/Ethnicity		Sex		Military/Civilian Status		Enlisted/Officer Status	
Risk Factor	Total DoD Aggregation	Non- Hispanic White	Racial/ Ethnic Minority	Male	Female	Military	Civilian	Enlisted	Officer
Alcohol Impairing Memory	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
Binge Drinking	5%	5%	4%	6%	2%	5%	3%	6%	3%
Racially Harassing Behaviors	17%	13%	22%	16%	22%	18%	16%	19%	14%
Sexist Behaviors	8%	7%	10%	5%	16%	9%	7%	9%	6%
Sexually Harassing Behaviors	14%	13%	16%	12%	19%	16%	10%	17%	11%
Stress	42%	41%	41%	38%	50%	42%	41%	42%	39%
Workplace Hostility	14%	13%	15%	13%	15%	14%	13%	15%	9%
Passive Leadership (Commander)	17%	15%	19%	17%	16%	18%	15%	19%	14%
Passive Leadership (Senior NCO/SEL)	13%	12%	15%	13%	12%	14%	9%	15%	10%
Toxic Leadership (Immediate Supervisor)	9%	8%	9%	8%	10%	9%	9%	9%	6%
Toxic Leadership (Senior NCO/SEL)	5%	4%	5%	5%	4%	5%	2%	5%	3%

### Appendix A3: 2024 DEOCS Aggregations U.S. Coast Guard

This appendix provides the 2024 DEOCS protective and risk factor scores for the Coast Guard. These scores are aggregated across all responding units and organizations in the Coast Guard in 2024. Overall Coast Guard aggregations include 398 Active and Reserve Coast Guard registrations, including the Coast Guard Academy. These 398 registrations included 50,539 rostered Coast Guard personnel with 26,662 completed responses (53% response rate)

Table A3-1. 2024 DEOCS Protective Factor Favorable Rating Aggregations: Total DoD and Coast Guard

Protective Factor	Total DoD	Coast Guard Overall
Cohesion	73%	81%
Connectedness	77%	84%
Engagement & Commitment	75%	78%
Fairness	58%	64%
Morale	46%	53%
Safe Storage for Lethal Means	83%	84%
Work-Life Balance	68%	70%
Leadership Support (Immediate Supervisor)	84%	89%
Transformational Leadership (Commander)	72%	79%
Transformational Leadership (Senior NCO/SEL)	69%	72%

Table A3-2. 2024 DEOCS Risk Factor Unfavorable Rating Aggregations: Total DoD and Coast Guard

Risk Factor	Total DoD	Coast Guard Overall
Alcohol Impairing Memory	1%	1%
Binge Drinking	5%	4%
Racially Harassing Behaviors	17%	13%
Sexist Behaviors	8%	6%
Sexually Harassing Behaviors	14%	11%
Stress	42%	44%
Workplace Hostility	14%	9%
Passive Leadership (Commander)	17%	15%
Passive Leadership (Senior NCO/SEL)	13%	10%
Toxic Leadership (Immediate Supervisor)	9%	6%
Toxic Leadership (Senior NCO/SEL)	5%	3%

### 9 Appendix B: 2024 On-Site Installation Evaluation (OSIE)

#### 9.1 Introduction

OSIEs were directed in 2021 following the Report from the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee (2020). OSIEs aim to provide leaders at the highest levels of the Department early detection of risk and protective factors that can negatively and positively impact command climates at installations and ships across the Total Force. Such visibility enables early action to promote and sustain strong command climates and prevent harmful behaviors that often occur when unhealthy climates go unchecked. Site visits also highlight lessons learned and best practices that can be applied more broadly to inform future prevention policies, programs, and practices.

DoD continues its sustained commitment to detecting risk and protective factors related to harmful behaviors and evaluating the implementation of prevention activities and systems. DoDI 6400.11, "Integrated Primary Prevention Policy for Prevention Workforce and Leaders," requires the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) to conduct OSIEs every other year in accordance with the March 30, 2022, Secretary of Defense Memorandum. As of October 31, 2024, 74 OSIEs have been completed at installations and ships around the world.

In 2024, in addition to the biennial visits, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed follow-up visits to the 2021 OSIE sites be completed to reassess progress since the initial visit. The findings from the 2021 visits indicated most sites were in the preliminary phases of establishing prevention capabilities and efforts from the 2021 OSIE focused on foundational activities to build prevention capabilities and served as a baseline prior to the implementation of the IRC-SAM recommendations as approved by then-Secretary of Defense Austin.

#### 9.2 Methods

The primary focus of the 2024 reassessment visits was to measure progress made since 2021 to improve integrated primary prevention capabilities for the military community. The methodology used to conduct the 2024 site visits and assess prevention capabilities can be found in the 2023 OSIE Summary (DoD, 2023). Additionally, the OSIE Resilience Index<sup>53</sup> and changes in DEOCS results over time were used in 2024 for information and data gathering to inform the site visit.

Depicted in Table B1, a total of 15 installations/ships were visited in 2024. Due to operational mission requirements and competing priorities, 10 of the previous installations/ships were unavailable and, as a result, were not revisited.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> The OSIE Resilience Index is constructed of five domains: individual, workplace, leadership, installation, and community. These five domains constitute a robust social ecological model tailored for the military environment. A "best fit" approach was used to place each risk/protective factor into a single level of the social ecological framework.

Table B1. 2024 OSIE Sites by Military Department

Department of the Army	Department of the Navy	Department of the Air Force
Fort Bliss, TX	NSF Saratoga Springs, NY	Dyess AFB, TX
Joint Base Elmendorf- Richardson, AK	NS Norfolk, VA	Laughlin AFB, TX
USAG Ansbach, Germany	USS Ross (Norfolk), VA	Vandenberg SFB, CA
USAG Bavaria, Germany	USS James E. Williams (Norfolk), VA	United States Air Force Academy, CO <sup>54</sup>
USAG Stuttgart, Germany	MCB Hawaii, HI	
USAG Rheinland-Pfalz, Germany	NS Rota, Spain	

While unable to fully participate in the OSIE process due to operational mission requirements, both Fort Johnson, LA, and Naval Station (NS) Rota, Spain, engaged with the OSIE team. Fort Johnson hosted a Site Assistance Visit to broadly review prevention efforts and programs. NS Rota provided written feedback on their POAM updates and integrated primary prevention efforts. The findings from these engagements are not included in this report.

The 2024 reassessment visits were used to evaluate progress of previous sites for the first time. The assessed capabilities are critical for developing a cohesive, Department-wide workforce with a focus on integrated prevention to keep efforts focused on bolstering foundational actions. The findings underscore the need for sustained commitment to developing the workforce and collaborative efforts at every echelon.

### 9.3 2024 Key Takeaways

In 2021, findings indicated Department-wide nascent prevention capabilities; therefore, foundational actions were directed. The 2024 reassessment findings identified that prevention capabilities had matured across all Military Departments, with greatest gains where collaborative and equipped prevention workforce were in place. Prevention capabilities have matured more slowly in complex, joint, and remote locations. Findings also confirmed prevention infrastructure (e.g., Service instructions, data sharing forums) is not entirely in place. Therefore, all 2021 foundational actions must be complete before sites can truly improve the fidelity of prevention efforts. Table B2 describes key takeaways for each Military Department

Table B2. 2024 OSIE Key Takeaways by Military Department

# Department of the Army

1. Data is helping create targeted efforts specifically related to suicide but lack an integrated approach for multiple harmful behaviors.

- 2. A phased approach to staffing and funding has resulted in prevention efforts only just beginning at certain regions and installations.
- 3. Joint Base environments contribute to ambiguity surrounding the IPPW mission, including limited collaboration amongst personnel and duplicative policies/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> The United States Air Force Academy was not a part of the 2021 OSIE sites, however, a follow-up visit was conducted at the request of the Secretary of the Air Force.

	procedures from the represented Military Departments. Unit status of tenant, transient, or rotational impact Service member quality of life and ability to utilize resources.
	Leadership is committed to and prioritizes prevention, though many foundational actions are still underway.
Department of the Navy	<ol><li>Personnel and Service members acknowledge that prevention services are needed onboard all vessels, regardless of size, during deployments.</li></ol>
	<ol> <li>It is critical to continue evaluating how various mission elements unique to the Navy (e.g., being in the shipyard/on shore duty) may impact quality of life.</li> </ol>
	Personnel and Service members expressed the need for and demonstrate a desire for prevention; however, barriers persist.
Department of the Air Force	<ol> <li>Environmental factors must continue to be assessed in the context of prevention efforts to better understand impact on quality of life of remote or isolated locations.</li> </ol>
. 0. 00	<ol> <li>Unit status of tenant, transient, or rotational impact the Service member's quality of life and ability to utilize resources.</li> </ol>

### 9.4 2024 Themes & Way Forward

Site Visit Teams reviewed progress on the updated POAMs, compiled notes from each focus group, and systematically extracted themes for critical topics at each installation/ship. After identifying themes for each installation/ship, a qualitative analysis was performed to identify common themes present across the Department. The SVT identified four critical themes:

### 1) Integrated Primary Prevention Workforce (IPPW) needs access to data to inform prevention activities.

Issued in 2022, the Department's policy on integrated primary prevention (IPP) for the prevention workforce (DoDI 6400.11, 2022), provided guidance for activities of prevention personnel with an emphasis on using data to advise leaders. The Department must ensure hired personnel have the tools to perform prevention duties. Increasing access to—and awareness of—DoD-wide data systems is crucial to equip the IPPW to effectively support leaders in carrying out prevention efforts.

At several locations, IPPW noted the lack of access to data necessary to inform prevention planning and complete requirements cited in DoDI 6400.11. For example, Command Climate Assessments require analysis of multiple sources of data to which IPPW report they are not able to consistently access (DoD, 2025).

#### Way Forward

To increase IPPW access to data, DoD is continuing to establish the IPPW functional community. The Department has greatly invested in hiring the IPPW and ensuring tools are available to assist the workforce in successfully completing their day-to-day requirements.

The Office of Force Resiliency is working with the Military Departments and OSD offices to equip the workforce to perform their duties. **Prevention.mil** serves as the homepage for the IPPW. There are many

resources available on the site, with posts with new information and updates pertinent to the IPPW regularly published.

### 2) Resources are competing and duplicative in environments with multiple assets.

Complex environments present multiple challenges that must be addressed through Service instructions to optimize IPPW capabilities. SVTs noted several challenges in large environments with multiple assets, specifically related to overlapping resources. The considerations below may lead to duplicative efforts across IPPW and collaborative agencies:

- In geographic areas with multiple Military Services present, the IPPW are not well integrated and track trends only for its specific Service, rather than across the entire installation. The role of the IPPW is to coordinate support for the military community and streamline prevention efforts.
- Resources may not be available to all Service members, regardless of organization or Service
  affiliation. To ensure a "No Wrong Door" approach, resources must be accessible to all Service
  members at the installation.
- Identified oversight, lines of effort, and expectations for collaboration at installations with IPPW
  from multiple Military Services do not currently exist in a codified policy. For example, on an
  installation with three Military Services present, Site Visit Teams observed three separate CIPP
  Plans being completed to satisfy DoDI 6400.11 requirements. CIPP Plans intend to
  comprehensively capture data across the entire installation; completing three separate CIPP
  Plans further silos data and collaboration across the Military Services.

It is evident personnel in complex environments need clarity on roles and expectations for completing policy requirements. Additionally, it is critical that personnel consistently communicate to limit redundancy of efforts.

#### Way Forward

Efforts are currently underway to better understand Joint Base and complex environments to effectively identify solutions to duplicative resources in environments with multiple assets. For 2025 OSIE visits, several sites were chosen to better understand Joint Base and complex environments, where multiple Military Services are present on an installation. These visits will inform recommendations to address the most efficient use of prevention assets.

#### 3) Service culture influences command climate.

Based on site visits to installations and ships around the world, pervasive Service culture is a strong influencer of command climate. This is evident through cross-Service variation in DEOCS findings, as referenced in previous parts of this report. Service culture is typically rooted in long-standing organizational tradition and can permeate installations and ships.

The perception of Service members and civilians regarding a unit's practices, policies, beliefs, and attitudes significantly influences the command climate of that unit. In focus group sessions, junior Service members discussed the impact of their leaders' stoic attitudes and responses to traumatic events such as deaths by suicide. They attributed the response as a cultural norm of concealing emotions, ultimately causing junior Service members to perceive a lack of empathy from leadership, reportedly harming morale.

To effectively prevent harmful behaviors at an installation or ship, the culture of the organization must be understood. Prevention activities should be crafted with an understanding of long-held beliefs and traditions, identifying how these cultural factors can be leveraged or adjusted to strengthen command climate.

#### Way Forward

Service culture influencing command climate will be analyzed in 2025, as OSIE installations/ships were chosen based on shared geographic regions. To identify 2025 units of interest, two data models were used: the Resilience Index and Well-Being Indicators. Installations/units were selected based on connected geography/regions, environmental factors, and demographic clusters to increase understanding of comparable protective and risk factors.

This methodology intends to gain further information on the impact of Service culture on command climate by controlling for environmental factors, as varying assets will be visited (e.g., Navy, Air Force, Army) within the same geography/region.

Additionally, the methodology aims to address unexplored areas in previous OSIE site types (e.g., submarines) to acquire additional knowledge about command climate in unique operational environments. Ultimately, this approach will enable greater insight into the impact of Service culture on command climate. Gathering this information will allow for targeted prevention efforts and illuminate areas for growth, both of which are critical to building a strong, integrated prevention capability across the Total Force.

### 4) The Department must seek to better understand quality of life indicators in relation to prevention of harmful behaviors.

The OSIE visits highlighted the need to better understand the impact of quality of life on harmful behaviors across Military Services. In the context of the military, the quality-of-life indicators specifically focus on childcare, housing, pay and compensation, spousal support, and access to healthcare. Integrated primary prevention seeks to stop harmful behaviors from occurring, focusing on broader, upstream factors that contribute to their occurrence.

These quality of life indicators have a significant impact on Service members' overall well-being, serving as protective factors against multiple harmful behaviors. Conversely, if unaddressed, these factors have the potential to exacerbate existing risk factors. Identifying and understanding the relationship between quality of life indicators and harmful behaviors is critical to successful prevention efforts.

#### Wav Forward

To better understand quality of life indicators in relation to prevention of harmful behaviors, the Office of Command Climate and Well-Being Integration has recently expanded its mission and, by extension, OSIE visits, to further contextualize quality of life and the relationship with harmful behaviors. Previous OSIE visits have underscored the need to better understand quality of life indicators and identify best practices as a part of integrated primary prevention activities. As a result, 2025 OSIE visits focus on these specific characteristics to provide insights to DoD the Department on how to improve well-being.

Additionally, the Department launched "Taking Care of Our People" to enhance the welfare and well-being of Service members and families. One of the seven key initiatives is for the Department to review risk and protective factors and prevention capabilities of harmful behaviors at three remote installations. Information from the 2025 OSIE visits will be used to improve quality of life at these remote installations.

#### 9.5 Conclusion

Over the past several years, the Department has taken unprecedented actions and provided oversight to prevent harmful behaviors and improve command climate. The insights gained have helped increase protective measures and supported integrated primary prevention efforts across the military community. Specifically, new policies and programs have been established to reduce harmful behaviors, including sexual assault, harassment, suicide, retaliation, domestic abuse, and child abuse/neglect in the military. Although progress has been made, particularly in hiring the prevention workforce, OSIE findings indicate that continuous assessment and evaluation are needed to identify further areas of improvement.

The 2024 OSIE visits confirmed progress since initial site visits in 2021 but reinforced the need for continued efforts to cement foundational actions and guidance. Additionally, the site visits highlighted the need to take a closer look at Service culture and quality-of-life issues. OSIEs aim to provide leaders at the highest levels of the Department with early detection of risk factors negatively impacting command climate at installations across the military community. This level of oversight helps reduce the spread of negative command climates and address harmful behaviors often reinforced in such environments. OSIE visits are essential to identifying lessons learned and best practices that inform future policies and programs.